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ARTICLES
ALIEN LANGUAGE: IMMIGRATION
METAPHORS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
OTHERNESS
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter*
Metaphors tell the story of immigration law. Throughout its immigration
jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed rich metaphoric
language to describe immigrants attacking nations and aliens flooding
communities. This Article applies research in cognitive linguistics to
critically evaluate the metaphoric construction of immigrants in the law.
Three conceptual metaphors dominate legal texts: IMMIGRANTS ARE
ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. In
order to gauge the prevalence of these metaphors, the Article engages in a
textual analysis of modern Supreme Court opinions and presents original
empirical data on the incidence of alienage terminology in federal court
decisions. The Article explains how immigration metaphors influence not
only judicial outcomes, but also social discourse and the broader debate
over immigration reform. As such, the theoretical study of language has
very practical consequences for the people defined by immigration
metaphors.
The Article concludes by proposing an oppositional metaphoric
framework based on the concepts of migration and economic sanctuary.
These metaphors describe immigration in terms of movement, work, and
community, in contrast to existing legal metaphors that describe
immigration in terms of danger, attack, and criminality. Thus, while
today’s immigration metaphors signify a loss of economic security and
cultural hegemony, the proposed terms emphasize immigrants’ economic
contributions and potential for social belonging. This process of evaluation
and substitution diminishes the power of existing metaphors to conflate and

* Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University. J.D., Stanford University. I am
grateful to David Frank, Kevin Johnson, Hiroshi Motomura, and Leti Volpp for sharing their
insights and expertise on this topic. I also thank Laura Appleman, Richard Birke, Caroline
Davidson, and Paul Diller for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
David Anderson, Andrea Breinholt, Marshall Dunst, and Michael Owens provided
outstanding research assistance throughout this project. Finally, I thank Dean Symeon
Symeonides for providing generous research support for this Article. All errors are
exclusively my own.

1545

1546

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

essentialize, while creating space in the legal imagination for new frames to
emerge.
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INTRODUCTION
“An Oriental invasion . . . a menace to our civilization . . . .”
-Justice Stephen J. Field, 1889 1
“‘[T]his silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico . . . .’”
-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 1975 2
“[T]he northbound tide of illegal entrants . . . .”
-Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 2000 3
1. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
2. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 904 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402–08 (S.D. Cal. 1973)).
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William Rehnquist referred to Mexican children as “wetbacks.” 4 No one
disputes that the future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court used the ethnic
slur in front of his colleagues in 1981. 5 When a shocked Justice Thurgood
Marshall objected, Justice Rehnquist defended himself arguing that
“wetback” still carried “currency in his part of the country.” 6
Justice Rehnquist would go on to author some of the most important
immigration decisions of the late twentieth century. In those opinions, he
did not refer to immigrants as “wetbacks.” Rather he employed a rich array
of metaphors to describe a nation at risk. He wrote of “an avalanche of
claims” coming from unauthorized immigrants. 7 He described the fight
against illegal immigration as a form of “‘national self protection.’” 8 He
argued that federal law must “combat[] the employment of illegal aliens.” 9
The larger cognitive frame structuring these statements might be described
as IMMIGRATION IS A LOSING BATTLE. 10 Illegal aliens are entering the
country like an avalanche—dangerous, monolithic, overpowering, and
unstoppable. Law enforcement officers are engaged in combat for national
self-protection. In this metaphoric war, Supreme Court Justices become
soldiers who must protect citizens against the impending alien offensive.
A growing body of research in cognitive linguistics demonstrates that
human beings view the world in metaphoric terms. 11 In attempting to

3. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000).
4. Justice William J. Brennan, Conference Notes, Plyler v. Doe (Nos. 80-1538, 801934) (Dec. 8, 1981) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William J.
Brennan Papers, Part I: Box 572). A “wetback” is a racist term first used in 1929 to refer to
Mexican people crossing the Rio Grande River. 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 173
(2d ed. 1989); see also Rocha Virgil v. City of Las Cruces, 119 F.3d 871, 871–74 (10th Cir.
1997) (Lucero, J., dissenting) (comparing the term to other racial epithets).
5. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 760–63 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
6. William J. Brennan, Conference Histories IX, Plyler v. Doe (Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934)
(on file with author); see also Jim Newton, The Brennan Memos, SLATE (Jan. 9–11, 2007),
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2156940/entry/2156943/.
7. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 504 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
8. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).
9. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (emphasis
added).
10. Throughout this Article, I employ the linguistic convention of using small capital
letters to refer to conceptual metaphors and italicized letters to refer to metaphoric linguistic
expressions. See infra Part I.A and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
conceptual metaphors and metaphoric linguistic expressions); see also Bruce Kochis &
Diane Gillespie, Conceptual Metaphors as Interpretive Tools in Qualitative Research: A
Re-Examination of College Students’ Diversity Discussions, 11 QUALITATIVE REP. 566, 567
n.1 (2006) (using the convention).
11. See generally MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND
DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF
& MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
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comprehend new ideas, people borrow from familiar concepts.12 The
metaphors floating in our minds determine our linguistic choices, which in
turn affect social discourse and ultimately social action. Thus, how we
think metaphorically affects how we talk about problems and the solutions
we formulate in response to those problems. 13 This becomes a selffulfilling prophecy: the more we repeat, circulate, and repackage certain
metaphors, the more our conceptual domains become tied to a limited set of
associations. 14
Justice Rehnquist’s description of immigrants illustrates this point. By
using and defending the word “wetback” in front of his colleagues, Justice
Rehnquist revealed a particular perspective on immigration. As his defense
of the term suggests, he viewed “wetback” as a neutral word—simply a way
to refer to Mexican immigrants that was linguistically and culturally
appropriate in “his part of the country.” 15 His conceptual frame of
immigrants, then, created a version of reality that highlighted certain
features of immigrants, while obscuring others. 16 Namely, the image of
immigrants as “wetbacks” focuses on immigration-related characteristics
such as illegality, ethnicity, and invasion, while concealing other
characteristics such as personhood, diversity, and belonging. Through this
process of metaphoric framing, inferences and understandings arise that
severely restrict the universe of possible judicial outcomes. 17
The external face of the law denies the importance of language, yet
metaphor’s prevalence in legal texts indicates otherwise. 18 Supreme Court
opinions that appear to express objective legal principles rely heavily on
nonliteral language to reach their conclusions.19 For example, the Supreme
The wall of
Court frequently refers to corporations as people. 20
separation 21 and the marketplace of ideas protect First Amendment

12. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5; Jayne Seminare Docherty, Narratives,
Metaphors, and Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 847–48 (2004) (applying conceptual
metaphor theory to negotiation practice).
13. Gerald V. O’Brien, Metaphors and the Pejorative Framing of Marginalized Groups:
Implications for Social Work Education, 45 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 29, 32 (2009).
14. See Charles L. Briggs, Communicability, Racial Discourse, and Disease, 34 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 269, 272 (2005) (explaining how narratives become authoritative
through the processes of appropriation and reception).
15. Brennan, supra note 6, at IX (recounting Justice Rehnquist’s explanation).
16. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 157–58.
17. Id.
18. See Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J.
181, 235 (2004) (arguing that legal metaphors are both regressive and dynamic).
19. HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 200 (1992)
(discussing the prevalence of metaphors in legal texts).
20. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Linda L.
Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of
Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169,
171 (2004) (criticizing the use of metaphors to associate corporations with people).
21. BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 73–94 (noting the prevalence of the wall metaphor in
the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Establishment Clause); Michael R. Smith, Levels of
Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 925–26 (2007) (analyzing
the wall metaphor).
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rights. 22 States are laboratories. 23 The list goes on and on. Immigration is
no exception to metaphor’s ubiquity in the law. 24
This Article explores the prevailing metaphors of immigration law and
examines the social and legal consequences of their use. Employing a
critical discourse framework, I assert that three immigration metaphors
dominate Supreme Court texts: IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS
A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION.
Part I of this Article establishes a method for understanding these terms
by introducing the conceptual theory of metaphor. According to cognitive
linguists, human thought is defined by metaphors. 25 I evaluate Stephen
Winter’s claim that legal reasoning is grounded in metaphors that derive
from our “embodied” experiences as physical, social, and cultural beings.26
Applying Winter’s theory to immigration metaphors, I explain why the
dangers of distortion and conflation—risks associated with all metaphors—
are heightened in the immigration context.
Working from the critical framework established in Part I, Part II
analyzes the conceptual metaphors of three modern Supreme Court
opinions. In undoubtedly the most important constitutional decision
affecting unauthorized immigrants in the last century, 27 the Supreme Court
referred to a “shadow population” of millions of “illegal aliens” 28 that
constituted “an ever-increasing flood.” 29 In its most important labor law
decision involving immigrants, the Court described the criminality of
“illegal aliens.” 30 Finally, in the deportation context, the Supreme Court
analogized the detention of immigrants to the discovery of “contraband

22. See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 200 (questioning whether the marketplace
metaphor is appropriate in modern society).
23. See generally James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State
Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996).
24. Although legal scholars have not analyzed immigration metaphors comprehensively,
several have offered thoughtful analyses of various aspects of immigration discourse. See,
e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National
Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 565–90 (1996) (analyzing the rhetoric of opponents of
immigration restrictionists); Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws:
The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263,
272–73 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws]; Kevin R.
Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2085–87 (2008) (discussing the
dueling rhetorical formulations of “rule of law” rhetoric in immigration debates); Gerald L.
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of
Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1995).
25. ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES, METAPHOR:
A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION viii (2002)
(summarizing the “cognitive linguistic view of metaphor”).
26. Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1130–36, 1142–56 (1988).
27. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
28. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
30. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143 (2002) (emphasis
added).
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explosives or drugs.” 31 I explain that, rather than stand as outliers, these
cases join a much larger body of Supreme Court decisions that use
metaphors to describe immigration in terms of criminality, flood, and
attack.
In Part III, I explain how the Supreme Court’s metaphors interact with
metaphors from other important cultural institutions like Congress to create
a social understanding of “the immigration problem” and the necessary
solutions to the problem. 32 For example, if immigrants are viewed as
illegal alien criminals, then they should be captured and deported. If
immigration is an invasion from the south, then the government should
construct a virtual fence across the border to resist the Mexican offensive.
These “common sense” responses are made possible by selective
metaphoric framing.
The Article concludes by proposing several avenues for discursive
change. First, I assert that similes are more effective vehicles for
understanding immigration-related concepts than metaphors. Because
similes stimulate analogic reasoning, they are less likely than metaphors to
encourage cognitive shortcuts and conflate ideas. Given that human
reasoning depends on figurative associations, however, metaphors will
remain fundamental components of discourse and thought. Because of
metaphor’s omnipresence in law, I argue that speakers must develop an
oppositional metaphoric framework to compete with dominant accounts.33
I suggest two alternative metaphors: unauthorized immigrants should be
referred to as migrants, and illegal immigration should instead be thought
of as a process of obtaining economic sanctuary.
In contrast to existing terms that describe nonhumans who attack,
migration describes people who move. Whereas the Supreme Court’s
current immigration metaphors focus on criminality, economic sanctuary
focuses on the human consequences of globalization and the displacement
of workers. Finally, while current frames signify a loss of economic
security and cultural hegemony, the proposed terms highlight immigrants’
economic contributions and potential for social belonging.
In the midst of heated immigration debates and calls for greater
restrictions, we should pause for a moment to consider the role metaphors
play in the social and legal construction of noncitizens. As George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson—the pioneers of conceptual metaphor theory—remind
us, “[P]eople in power get to impose their metaphors.”34 The Supreme
Court has imposed many immigration metaphors on the legal community.
31. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984) (emphasis added).
32. GEORGE LAKOFF & SAM FERGUSON, THE FRAMING OF IMMIGRATION 1–2 (2006)
(analyzing the “Immigration Problem Frame”); Lisa Marie Cacho, ‘The People of California
Are Suffering’: The Ideology of White Injury in Discourses of Immigration, 4 CULTURAL
VALUES 389, 394 (2000) (explaining how immigration metaphors rationalize
“commonsense” responses).
33. See Phyllis Pease Chock, Ambiguity in Policy Discourse: Congressional Talk About
Immigration, 28 POL’Y SCI. 165, 180 (1995) (explaining how personal narratives can serve as
oppositional frameworks).
34. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 157.
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This Article seeks to critically evaluate the metaphors of immigration law
so that competing frames might emerge.
I. CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND THE LAW
A. The Traditional and Cognitive Accounts
Metaphors are typically described as figures of speech used to understand
one concept in terms of another.35 The most common metaphoric
expression employs an “A is a B” format. 36 Thus, the expression “life is a
dance” makes the association between “life” and “dance” explicit.37 But a
person might also say, “I’m going to find a life partner” or “You take the
lead,” thereby associating living with dancing more indirectly. Regardless
of the format, however, the classical rhetorical definition of metaphor
involves a tacit comparison between two concepts. 38
Philosophers of language have long studied the role metaphor plays in
communicating ideas.39 Aristotle, the father of the traditional approach,
described metaphor as a method for producing understanding “through the
generic similarity.” 40 Under this view, metaphor has both descriptive and
normative components. On the descriptive side, metaphors are simply
linguistic expressions used for nonliteral comparisons. 41 Normatively, the
traditional view holds that metaphors are linguistically deviant because they
inhibit language’s primary function, which is to accurately represent
reality. 42
The conventional wisdom on metaphor took a radical turn in the midtwentieth century when theorists questioned the foregoing descriptive and
normative accounts. Although traditionalists viewed metaphor as a
rhetorical device, later theorists described metaphor in cognitive terms. The
influential twentieth-century philosopher and literary critic I.A. Richards
asserted that metaphor involves a “borrowing between and intercourse of
thoughts, a transaction between contexts.” 43 According to Richards, we
35. See Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J.
395, 405 (1986) (discussing the classical definition of metaphor); Bernard J. Hibbitts,
Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal
Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 233 (1994) (defining metaphor).
36. Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the
Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 547 (1998) (outlining
metaphoric formatting).
37. Hibbitts, supra note 35, at 234 (noting that metaphors create images that emphasize
specific qualities of particular referents).
38. See Andreas Musolff, What Role Do Metaphors Play in Racial Prejudice? The
Function of Antisemitic Imagery in Hitler’s Mein Kampf, 41 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 21, 23
(2007) (discussing metaphor’s ubiquity in social discourse).
39. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CAL. L. REV., 439, 462–65 (2003) (discussing the historical development of metaphor in law
and philosophy).
40. ARISTOTLE, THE “ART” OF RHETORIC 235 (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991).
41. Hunter, supra note 39, at 463.
42. Id. (discussing the “linguistic deviance” of metaphors and tracing the traditional
view to Aristotle).
43. I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 94 (1965).
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think metaphorically, and the figurative expressions we utter represent
underlying cognitive processes. 44 Max Black extended Richards’s initial
assault on the traditionalist approach by describing metaphoric meaning not
in terms of shared literal properties but in terms of shared concepts and
relationships. 45 Black analyzed the phrase “man is a wolf” to illustrate
what is known as the “interaction” theory of metaphor.46 Under this
approach, when listeners hear “man is a wolf,” they associate certain
characteristics and relationships with “man,” which then interact with
characteristics and relationships that they unconsciously associate with
“wolf.” 47 The interaction of these “associated commonplaces” produces a
unique meaning that cannot be explained through paraphrase. 48
Although the interaction theory of metaphor challenged many core
assumptions of the traditional view—that metaphors are solely ornamental,
linguistic, and comparative 49—Richards and Black left other questions
unanswered.
Namely: how does the human mind select certain
characteristics of a particular domain, while ignoring other potential
“associated commonplaces”? Thus, in the phrase “man is a wolf,” why do
we map concepts such as anger and ferocity from wolf to man, but filter out
other characteristics such as “has legs,” “breathes air,” or “drinks water”?50
Cognitive linguists addressed these and other questions in the latter half of
the twentieth century.
In their pioneering book Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson
applied research in philosophy and cognitive linguistics to the study of
metaphor. 51 Although prior theorists had discussed the cognitive nature of
metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson were the first to offer a comprehensive,
empirically tested approach. 52 According to their account, metaphors live
in the mind but reveal themselves in words and phrases.53 We scale our
conceptual metaphors according to familiarity, with abstract concepts
44. Id.
45. See Berger, supra note 20, at 174–77 (summarizing Black’s theory).
46. MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY
39–44 (1962).
47. Berger, supra note 20, at 175–76 (analyzing the man is a wolf metaphor); Hunter,
supra note 39, at 468–69 (same).
48. BLACK, supra note 46, at 44–46; see also Berger, supra note 20, at 176; Linda L.
Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme
Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 955 (2007)
(discussing Black’s theory).
49. David T. Ritchie, Who Is on the Outside Looking in, and What Do They See?:
Metaphors of Exclusion in Legal Education, 58 MERCER L. REV. 991, 992 (2007) (describing
the traditional view of metaphor as “a mere trick designed to conceal or cover over the
truth”).
50. Hunter, supra note 39, at 469 (discussing the limitations of Black’s theory).
51. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3–9; see also Otto Santa Ana et al., Awash
Under a Brown Tide: Immigration Metaphors in California Public and Print Media
Discourse, 23 AZTLÁN 137, 142 (1998) (arguing that Lakoff and Johnson’s work “signaled
the advent of cognitive science in understanding how metaphors shape everyday thinking”).
52. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at xi (discussing the significance of Lakoff and
Johnson’s work).
53. George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND
THOUGHT 202, 203 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993).
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understood in terms of more concrete experiences.54 Thus, in the metaphor
TIME IS MONEY, the abstract concept (time) is viewed in terms of a betterunderstood concept grounded in the real world (money). 55 Lakoff and
Johnson refer to the more obscure concept (i.e., the one the listener is trying
to understand) as the “target domain” (time) and the idea or experience
from which the listener borrows attributes as the “source domain”
(money). 56 Conceptual metaphors, thus, involve multiple mappings
between domains. 57
Cognitive linguists emphasize the difference between conceptual
metaphors and their linguistic expressions. 58 Conceptual metaphors
involve the process of understanding one conceptual domain in terms of
another. 59 Linguistic expressions are the words or phrases that reflect the
conceptual metaphor. 60 For example, a speaker might express the
conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER by stating: “He’s emptyheaded” or “She’s full of ideas.” 61 Whether or not the speaker actually
utters the conceptual metaphor, researchers can identify the underlying idea
based on the number of linguistic metaphoric expressions that refer to it.
Thus, conceptual metaphors are “ways of thinking” about concepts, while
linguistic expressions are “ways of talking” about them. 62 If a large
number of similar metaphoric expressions or “tokens” of conceptual
metaphors exist, then they likely evince an underlying conceptual
association. 63
The conceptual theory of metaphor addresses two key issues that prior
theories had failed to resolve: (1) the process through which the human
mind selects certain source domains over others, and (2) the criteria used to
map certain attributes within domains while ignoring others. According to

54. Hugh G. Petrie & Rebecca S. Oshlag, Metaphor and Learning, in METAPHOR AND
THOUGHT 579, 589 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (“[M]etaphor is what enables one to
pass from the more familiar to the unfamiliar . . . .”).
55. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9.
56. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing “conceptual domains”).
57. See Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY
L.J. 1197, 1212 (2001) (explaining how features of source domains are mapped onto target
domains); Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 882 (2006)
(discussing mappings).
58. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4–6; O’Brien, supra note 13, at 32 (distinguishing
between conceptual and linguistic metaphors).
59. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5.
60. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4.
61. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, The Metaphorical Structure of the Human
Conceptual System, 4 COGNITIVE SCI. 195, 196–97 (1980) (examining various examples of
ontological metaphors).
62. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 6 (describing metaphoric expressions as evidence of
conceptual metaphors).
63. Thomas H. Smith, When Experts Educate, What Do Their Metaphors Say? Complex
Metaphor Structure in the Professional Conflict Resolution Literature, 17 IBÉRICA 175, 176–
77 (2009).
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Lakoff and Johnson, the notion of “experientialism” explains these
unconscious metaphoric choices. 64
Experientialism holds that our understanding of the world is rooted in our
interactions with physical, social, and cultural environments. 65 For
example, when a parent holds a child, the child feels affection and warmth
at the same time. 66 By experiencing these stimuli simultaneously, the child
conflates the ideas of affection and warmth. The conceptual metaphor
AFFECTION IS WARMTH gives rise to statements such as: “Our relationship
has cooled recently” and “I received a warm reception from the
audience.” 67 Because the human mind operates in conjunction with a
physical body that dwells in the physical world, physical and spatial
perceptions largely determine our metaphoric understandings. 68
Source domains can be culturally grounded as well. In fact, the notion of
experientialism extends to every environment a human being encounters,
whether physical, cultural, social, economic, or moral.69 For example,
Western speakers often articulate the concept TIME IS MONEY through a
series of linguistic expressions such as “She spent her time wisely” or “I
should budget my time more effectively.” 70 Listeners draw meaning from
these statements based on shared cultural understandings of money and
business. Yet non-capitalist societies have very different perceptions of
transactions and therefore do not describe the concept of time in economic
terms. 71 Whether metaphors are grounded in physical, social, or cultural
knowledge, listeners will evaluate the accuracy of a particular metaphoric
statement based on their embodied knowledge. 72 As explained below, this
experiential approach to human reasoning provides a useful tool for
evaluating the operation of legal metaphors in general and immigration
metaphors in particular.

64. See Marina Rakova, The Philosophy of Embodied Realism: A High Price to Pay?,
13 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 215, 216 (2002) (discussing Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of
“experientialism” or “embodied realism”).
65. Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 949, 950 (2002) (“[O]ur
conceptualization and reasoning are grounded in our bodily experience, shaped by patterns
of perception and action.”).
66. See Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 859–60
(2007) (discussing associations between domains).
67. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 48–49 (1999); see also Johnson, supra
note 66, at 859–60 (explaining how physical associations give rise to many primary
metaphors).
68. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 14–21 (discussing orientational metaphors);
Stuart J. Kaplan, Let Me Hear Your Web Sights: Visual and Aural Metaphors for the
Internet, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 299, 306–08 (2004) (same).
69. Johnson, supra note 66, at 846 (“Our embodiment shapes both what and how we
experience, think, mean, imagine, reason, and communicate.”).
70. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9 (analyzing the TIME IS MONEY
metaphor); BRUCE MCCONACHIE, AMERICAN THEATER IN THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR:
PRODUCING AND CONTESTING CONTAINMENT, 1947–1962, at 14–15 (2003) (discussing the
cultural grounding of metaphor).
71. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9.
72. See id.
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B. The Metaphoric Nature of Legal Reasoning
Much like traditional philosophers of language, early legal commentators
viewed metaphor with great skepticism. Lord Mansfield opined that
“nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor,” 73 Jeremy Bentham
stated tersely that “[m]etaphors are not [r]easons,”74 and Justice Benjamin
Cardozo warned that metaphors “end often by enslaving [thought].” 75
Early critics of legal metaphors embraced a rationalist view of law that
dismissed metaphors as distracting rhetorical flourishes. 76 Rationalists
viewed the law as a product of logical, impartial discernment. 77 According
to this account, lawyers are not reality-makers but rather creative
applicators of a rule-based system. 78 As such, metaphors cannot create
multiple realities because the law embodies a singular version of reality.
In his groundbreaking application of research in cognitive linguistics to
the law, Steven Winter offered an alternative account of the role played by
metaphor in legal thought.79 According to Winter, those who dismiss legal
metaphors as rhetorical trifles rely on flawed assumptions about human
rationality. Winter argues that legal reasoning is grounded in human
interactions, which become institutionalized first in social practices, and
later in cultural and legal norms. 80 Just as human reasoning is metaphoric,
so too is the law. 81 Because we think metaphorically based on our
“embodied interactions” with physical, social, and cultural environments,
the law also derives from these experiences.82 The law’s metaphoric
grounding allows for dynamic change as social practices and cultural
understandings develop. 83 As Winter states, “Actual examination of legal
metaphors—how they work, how they come to be, how they come to be
meaningful and persuasive to us as embodied, socially-situated human
beings—shows that . . . metaphor is both the product and embodiment of
constraint.” 84

73. Knox v. Gye, (1871) 5 L.R.E. & I. App. 656, 676 (H.L.); see also Thomas Ross,
Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1057 n.9 (1989) (discussing early criticisms of
metaphors in law).
74. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69–71 (1911).
75. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
76. See Ross, supra note 73, at 1057 n.9 (examining the formalist view of metaphor).
77. See Berger, supra note 20, at 178 (discussing legal fundamentalism).
78. See MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 8
(1985) (characterizing objectivism as the “received tradition” of law).
79. See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
(2001); Winter, supra note 26; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing]; Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721 (1996).
80. WINTER, supra note 79, at 193.
81. See id. at 197 (arguing that legal reasoning does not operate in a rule-like way).
82. Johnson, supra note 65, at 958.
83. See Winter, supra note 57, at 895–96 (challenging both the objectivist and
subjectivist accounts of law).
84. Id. at 897.

1556

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

According to this experientialist account, there is no law without
metaphor. 85 Metaphors do not misrepresent the law; metaphor is the law
because human reasoning is essentially metaphoric. At its core, then, the
conceptual theory of metaphor “humanizes” the law by situating it within
social institutions and ordinary thought processes.86
Winter’s experiential understanding of legal metaphors raises several
questions about the metaphoric construction of immigrants in the law. If
human beings comprehend foreign concepts through metaphors, then we
would expect the law to employ many metaphors to describe immigrants
and immigration (i.e., people and processes perceived as “different” or
“foreign” and therefore in need of greater explanation). In addition, if
source domains are experientially grounded, then we would expect
immigration metaphors to reference basic human experiences such as
survival and self-protection, as well as basic culturally constructed concepts
such as race and ethnicity. As seen below, the Supreme Court’s
immigration metaphors bear these hypotheses out, producing reified images
of immigrants that legal actors have largely adopted through unconscious
associations.
C. Immigration Metaphors and the Dangers of Conflation
Cognitive linguists warn that metaphors can mislead as well as
enlighten. 87 As a selective process that emphasizes certain aspects of
source and target domains, while masking others, metaphors do not tell
stories completely. For example, the metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD
utilizes certain characteristics of “flood” (the source domain), while
underutilizing others. Thus, the metaphor brings focus to a flood’s
destructive qualities, while ignoring the fact that floods often recede and
leave fertile soil in their wake. Such mappings never capture the entire
source. The same is true for the selective highlighting of target domains.
The metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ILLEGAL ALIENS, for example, highlights
the criminal characteristics of some immigrants (the target domain), while
ignoring the fact that most immigrants reside legally in the United States.88
Metaphors are most likely to deceive listeners when they conflate two
domains entirely. If the target domain becomes the source domain in the
listener’s mind, then the mapping process changes from metaphoric to
literal. 89 An inverse relationship exists between a metaphor’s potential to
85. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
1035, 1063 (2002) (summarizing the cognitivist description of metaphor as a “feature of
reason itself”).
86. Johnson, supra note 65, at 951–53 (explaining how cultural understandings constrain
legal concepts).
87. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1387.
88. Randy Capps, U.S. Immigrant Workers and Families: Demographics, Labor Market
Participation, and Children’s Education, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 170, 170 (2007) (stating
that approximately thirty percent of U.S. immigrants lack legal status).
89. See STEPHEN ULLMAN, LANGUAGE AND STYLE 237–38 (1964) (“By unthinkingly and
mechanically repeating the same image, we may in the end forget that it is
metaphorical . . . .”).
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mislead and the extent to which readers understand it as a metaphoric
representation, rather than as a semi-literal representation. 90
Here I explain why the risk of distortion associated with all metaphors is
heightened in the immigration context. Most immigration metaphors are
what I call “personal metaphors,” meaning figurative representations that
describe people or social processes. For example, the Supreme Court
describes immigration using metaphors such as illegal alien, northbound
tide, and silent invasion. 91 The target domains of these metaphors (i.e., the
subjects that the metaphors are trying to explain) are not novel rules or legal
principles, but rather involve immigrants themselves. As explained
below, 92 immigration opinions often literalize these personal metaphors:
through metaphor, the immigrant becomes the alien, the alien becomes the
illegal, and the illegal becomes the Mexican.
The personal nature of immigration metaphors differs sharply from the
doctrinal nature of most legal metaphors. By “doctrinal metaphor” I mean a
figurative statement that attempts to summarize a legal rule or concept (e.g.,
marketplace of ideas, wall of separation, stream of commerce). 93 In
contrast to the personal nature of immigration metaphors, doctrinal
metaphors have received widespread evaluation and criticism from the legal
community, thereby reducing the risk that these metaphors will pass
unconsciously into the legal imagination. For example, even though the
marketplace of ideas metaphor 94 is an established part of the First
Amendment vernacular, it remains a statement that readers can observe and
assess. When the marketplace metaphor appears in written opinions, it
stands as an obvious shortcut to a broader legal principle, thereby inviting
criticism and proposals for change. Demonstrating the testability of the
metaphor, Cass Sunstein has argued that the marketplace concept
improperly commodifies the First Amendment, 95 and Kathleen Sullivan has
argued that speech is more like self-government than a sale of goods.96
These assessments are made possible because, like all doctrinal metaphors,
90. See Martha Grace Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in
Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV. 725, 795 (1994) (arguing that readers often mistake
metaphors for “more literal approximations of reality”).
91. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000) (emphasis added) (referring
to “the northbound tide of illegal entrants”); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 904 (1975)
(Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotations omitted)
(referring to the “silent invasion of illegal aliens”).
92. See infra Part II.D.1 (examining different permutations of the alien metaphor).
93. See Smith, supra note 21, at 921–23 (defining “doctrinal metaphors” and describing
them as both “powerful” and “dangerous”).
94. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1759 (1995) (discussing the history of the marketplace metaphor); see also Tsai, supra note
18, at 230 (referring to the marketplace metaphor as the “single most recognized metaphor in
all of constitutional law”).
95. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17–18
(1993); see also Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The
Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 267
(2002) (explaining how metaphors can mislead readers).
96. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949,
963 (1995).
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the marketplace metaphor summarizes a legal concept that lawyers, judges,
and scholars are predisposed to identify and debate.
Even if doctrinal metaphors pass unwittingly into everyday use, they
never conflate source and target domains completely. For example, we
know when we speak of a wall of separation that we are not talking about a
wall literally. Legal critics continue to question the wall metaphor, despite
its ubiquity. 97 Likewise, scholars have questioned whether corporations are
really people 98 and whether property rights are really bundles of sticks. 99
In contrast to doctrinal metaphors, the images of ethnicity and danger
contained in immigration metaphors create the impression that immigrants
can only be described in terms of alienage and criminality. Thus, although
scholars have paid substantial attention to doctrinal metaphors, immigration
metaphors have generated significantly less critical evaluation.
I propose two explanations for why immigration metaphors are more
likely to conflate source and target domains, while enjoying uncritical
acceptance. First, doctrinal metaphors attempt to neatly summarize
complex rules or concepts—a purpose arguably necessary to the
interpretation and enforcement of laws. They are “cognitively efficient”
because they establish criteria for resolving unpredictable problems that are
yet to occur. 100 As such, doctrinal metaphors are indicative of a “healthy
legal culture” because they facilitate a shared understanding of legal norms
and explain difficult legal concepts.101 In contrast, there is no way to
“neatly summarize” a group of noncitizens with varied backgrounds and
objectives. Thus, unlike doctrinal metaphors, the goals of immigration
metaphors are neither necessary nor attainable; metaphors that attempt to
capture the essence of immigrants will inevitably miss the mark and
therefore distort.
Second, although metaphors are a natural product of experiential
knowledge, not all experiences exist on equal cognitive planes. The social
and cultural understandings associated with immigration metaphors are
more likely to involve race, ethnicity, and self-protection—source domains
that operate on deeply unconscious levels because of the mind’s tendency to
sort this type of information based on invisible categorical structures.102
The intergroup judgments that flow from racialized perspectives are largely
unintentional and non-motivational. 103 If legal actors are unable to

97. See Stephen J. Safranek, Can Science Guide Legal Argumentation? The Role of
Metaphor in Constitutional Cases, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 357, 372 (1994) (discussing criticism
of the wall metaphor).
98. Berger, supra note 20, at 187 (considering the implications of using metaphors to
associate corporations with people).
99. Safranek, supra note 97, at 399–403.
100. Berger, supra note 20, at 173 (discussing metaphor’s cognitive benefits).
101. Tsai, supra note 18, at 189–90; see also BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 46–47
(arguing that metaphors are necessary for explaining abstractions).
102. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1216–20 (1995) (applying social cognition theory to discrimination claims under Title VII).
103. See id. at 1187–88.
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recognize the mind’s methods for sorting information related to outside
social groups, then they are equally unable to question the assumptions
upon which many immigration metaphors depend. As such, lawyers and
scholars have found it much easier to question assumptions contained in
doctrinal metaphors, such as whether ideas are commodities, than to
question the assumptions embedded in immigration metaphors, such as
whether immigrants are criminals or whether all illegal aliens come from
Mexico.
The foregoing discussion has established a framework for understanding
immigration metaphors from a cognitive perspective. According to the
theoretical approach outlined above, immigration metaphors tend to
highlight certain characteristics of noncitizens, while conflating and
distorting others. Until now, this discussion has been entirely a matter of
theory. It is now time to evaluate the metaphors of immigration law in
practice.
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE SUPREME COURT’S IMMIGRATION METAPHORS
Law is told through stories, and stories are told through metaphors. Here
I analyze the metaphors of immigration stories told by the Supreme Court.
These opinions address vastly different areas of the law and reach vastly
different conclusions about the extent of rights that immigrants should
enjoy. I tell an “immigrant-friendly” story that has been called a
“conceptual watershed in immigration law” for its focus on the universal
rights of noncitizens. 104 I tell an “anti-immigrant” story that has been
labeled a “human rights . . . crisis in immigration policy” for denying
unauthorized immigrants basic workplace remedies.105
What links these stories is not legal subject matter or judicial perspective.
Rather, these immigration stories demonstrate how Supreme Court Justices
with very different legal philosophies often engage in the shared endeavor
of constructing immigrants through metaphors. Justice Rehnquist, the
author of the “anti-immigrant” story, described “illegal aliens” as criminals
who trick businesses. 106 Justice William Brennan, the author of the
“immigrant-friendly” story (and Justice Rehnquist’s intellectual rival on the
left of the Court) 107 wrote of a “shadow population of illegal migrants” who
live within our borders. 108 These cases—ranging from constitutional law,

104. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54–
58 (1984); see also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 64–68 (2006) (summarizing reactions to Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982)).
105. LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS xxi (2004) (criticizing
the outcome in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)).
106. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147–48 (emphasis added).
107. Newton, supra note 6 (discussing the rivalry between Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan).
108. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982) (emphasis added) (internal citation and
quotations omitted).
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to labor law, to immigration law—suggest that the metaphoric construction
of immigrants is a conceptual process that cuts across ideological lines.
After telling three immigration stories, I explain how the metaphors
contained therein join a much larger body of metaphors in Supreme Court
opinions. I selected these cases based on their impact and relevance. To
that end, I considered Supreme Court opinions authored after 1965—the
year Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to
eliminate national origin quotas. 109 That year is widely regarded as the
beginning of the modern era of immigration law. 110 Older cases contain
metaphoric language as well, much of which is explicitly racist. 111 Such
decisions, however, do not provide the same insight into the contemporary
construction of immigrants in the law.
The conceptual metaphors that emerge from a critical evaluation of
IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS,
numerous Supreme Court texts are:
IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. Applying
the framework established above, I explain how the Court’s metaphors
draw from embodied knowledge to construct a psychologically reductive
image of immigrants in the legal imagination. In order to understand this
symbol-making process and consider discursive alternatives, we now turn
to the symbols themselves.
A. Plyler: Educating the Shadow Population
In 1977, a rural school district in Texas began charging $1000 tuition to
unauthorized immigrant children attending public school.112 The Tyler
Independent School District adopted the requirement after the Texas
legislature voted to limit free public education to “[e]very child in this state
who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien.” 113 By
altering the Texas Education Code in this way, the state legislature
effectively cut off funding to local school districts that wanted to educate
every child, regardless of status. As such, Tyler and other Texas towns
enacted measures designed to prevent the state from becoming a “haven for
illegal aliens.” 114
Parents of sixteen unauthorized immigrant children in Tyler brought suit
against Superintendent James Plyler. 115 All of the children were under the
109. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911.
110. See, e.g., Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants? The Unintended
Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL
RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 53, 66 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001) (discussing the
impact of the 1965 amendments to immigration law).
111. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (“And it may be that the national government . . . has the
power to build, as it were, a Chinese wall around our borders and absolutely forbid aliens to
enter.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added)
(referring to “vast hordes of . . . people crowding in upon us”).
112. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
113. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 & n.1 (citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp.
1981)).
114. Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 572 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 574–75.
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age of fourteen and each lived with a sibling who had legal status. 116 The
families’ decision to sue did not come without risks. The local U.S.
Attorney had reportedly asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to deport the plaintiffs and conduct an immigration sweep in Tyler.117
To the plaintiffs’ lawyers, this was the Latino community’s chance to
achieve a civil rights victory comparable to Brown v. Board of
Education 118: an opportunity to challenge an egregious instance of
discrimination against a subordinated ethnic group.119 To supporters of the
Texas statute, this was one state’s admirable attempt to do what the federal
government had failed to achieve: contain the growing illegal alien
problem.
The case of Plyler v. Doe 120 represented a seven-year legal battle that
culminated in a 5-4 Supreme Court ruling striking down the Texas statute
on equal protection grounds. 121 Immigration scholars regard Plyler as “the
ultimate aliens’ rights decision” for opposing “caste legislation in
America.” 122 According to many accounts, the case represents a high-water
mark in immigration law because of its steadfast focus on universalism and
equal personhood. 123 Despite the praise heaped on Plyler’s holding,
however, less attention has been paid to the metaphors used to achieve this
outcome. 124 In fact, an analysis of Plyler’s text reveals that, despite the
case’s famously egalitarian ends, the decision relies on restrictive
metaphors to portray a nation overcome by illegal immigration.
Plyler depicts immigrants in hiding. The opinion refers to a “shadow
population of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our
borders.” 125 Because they dwell in the shadows, members of this
116. See Brief for Appellees at 2 & 3 n.9, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1986) (No. 801538), 1980 WL 339676 at *2–3.
117. Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, The Education of Undocumented Children, and
the Polity, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 197, 203–04 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds.,
2005) (discussing Plyler’s case history).
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. Id. at 201.
120. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
121. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
122. BOSNIAK, supra note 104, at 65–66 (internal citation and quotations omitted); see
also Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community
in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44 (1995) (discussing Plyler’s historical
significance); María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina
Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2005)
(same).
123. See BOSNIAK, supra note 104, at 65–67 (noting that critical commentary has both
castigated and celebrated Plyler’s outcome); Motomura, supra note 24, at 2043 (arguing that
the Supreme Court has largely contained Plyler’s holding); Nina Rabin et al., Understanding
Plyler’s Legacy: Voices from Border Schools, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 15, 15 (2008).
124. Although Plyler’s metaphors have not been analyzed in great detail, several scholars
have discussed the opinion’s competing rhetorical frames. See, e.g., BOSNIAK, supra note
104, at 66–67 (discussing the role of moral culpability in Plyler); Motomura, supra note 24,
at 2041–47 (analyzing Plyler’s discussion of unlawful presence, state power, and immigrant
integration); Schuck, supra note 104, at 55 (analyzing Plyler’s description of immigrant
parents and children).
125. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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population are “defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous
neglect.” 126 Denying them education would create “a subclass of illiterates
within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of
unemployment, welfare, and crime.” 127
Plyler is littered with metaphors of paternalism that cast immigrants as
nameless actors who depend on the Supreme Court for protection. But
Plyler’s metaphors do not construct all immigrants equally. The majority
opinion contrasts “undocumented children disabled by this
classification” 128 with the adult parents who brought the infirmity of illegal
status on their offspring:
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this
underclass . . . . [T]hose who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in
violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences,
including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal
entrants are not comparably situated. 129

Plyler castigates parents who enter the country illegally through
“voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the [undocumented] class is itself a
crime.” 130 According to Plyler’s metaphors, bad aliens are criminal adults,
while good aliens are infantilized immigrants who remain quiet and
vulnerable. 131 Legal responses emerge naturally from these frames: good
immigrants deserve an education; bad aliens deserve swift removal from the
country.
Although they disagreed on the substantive rights at issue, the Plyler
Justices shared a common vision of immigration as a dangerous body of
water. The word “influx,” which means “an inflow, as of a physical fluid,”
appears six times in the decision. 132 Justice Brennan wrote of Texas’s
attempt to “stem the tide of illegal immigration.” 133 Chief Justice Warren
Burger referred to “millions of illegal aliens flooding across our southern
border” and “an ever-increasing flood of illegal aliens—aliens over whose
entry or continued presence [the federal government] has no control.” 134
Rising floods must be contained, lest they drown the citizenry.
Accordingly, the solutions proposed in Plyler match the metaphors used to
define the problem. The majority described the need to “control[] the
126. Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex 1978)).
127. Id. at 230; see also id. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to the “subclass of
illiterate persons” who would add to the current problems of “unemployment, welfare, and
crime”).
128. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 219–20 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 219 n.19 (emphasis added).
131. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Good Aliens, Bad Aliens and the Supreme Court, in IX
IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 46, 46–47 (L. Tomasi ed., 1987) (discussing the legal
differentiation between aliens based on relative culpability); see also BOSNIAK, supra note
104, at 66–67 (examining the “innocent child/culpable adult opposition” in Plyler).
132. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–49 (majority opinion); 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
941 (2d ed. 1989).
133. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–29 (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp.
569, 585 (E.D. Tex 1978)).
134. Id. at 249, 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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influx of illegal entrants into the State,” 135 while the dissenting Justices
proposed “sealing our vast borders.” 136 According to Plyler, however,
these efforts will ultimately prove unsuccessful given the overwhelming
strength of the immigrant wave. Bodies of water are difficult to hold back.
Thus, notwithstanding “the serious national problems caused by the influx
of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders,” 137 the alien
inundation remains “virtually uncontrollable.” 138
Despite Plyler’s many references to floods, illegal immigration was more
like a trickle at the time the opinion was written in 1982. In fact, immigrant
children from Mexico accounted for less than two percent of the student
population in Texas schools. 139 In contrast to the “influx of uncountable
millions of illegal aliens” described by the Plyler dissent, 140 roughly two
million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in the early
1980s and accounted for less than fifteen percent of the foreign-born
population. 141 Immigrants were not an advancing body of water, but an
identifiable group of people that represented a relatively small proportion of
noncitizens in the United States. But Plyler’s water metaphors ignored this
demographic information. Through metaphor, waves washed away facts
and left a new reality in their wake.
According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, human beings naturally
map physical experiences onto more abstract domains. 142 Plyler’s
metaphors achieve this end by presenting an image of aliens submerging the
United States. When human beings are forced under water, they will do
anything to reach the surface. By creating the image of a sinking nation,
Plyler draws on our fear of drowning and our instinct to respond
aggressively to existential threats.
Plyler’s story begins with innocent children hiding in the shadows and
ends with adult criminals deluging the nation. The more Plyler imbues
immigrants with a sense of agency, the more menacing the metaphors
become. But submersion is not the only basic human experience triggered
by the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors. Human beings also fear
criminal attack. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 143 the next
immigration story told here, the Supreme Court employed metaphors of
stealth and criminality to describe the dangers of illegal immigration.

135. Id. at 228 n.24 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Tex 1978); Brief for Appellees at 3,
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (No. 80-1538), 1980 WL 339676.
140. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
141. See Jorge Chapa, A Demographic and Sociological Perspective on Plyler’s Children,
1980–2005, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 186, 186–91 (2008) (examining the popular association
of illegal alienage with Mexican national origin).
142. See Hunter, supra note 39, at 474–75 (explaining how legal scholarship often
describes virtual concepts in physical terms).
143. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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B. Hoffman: “An Illegal” Tries to Form a Union
In May 1988, Jose Castro applied for a job at a plastics factory in
Southern California. 144 Castro was a low-skilled employee who worked in
gardening and construction. The company, Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
was a family-owned business that made PVC pellets for customers. 145 As a
limited-English speaker with little education, Castro could not complete
Hoffman’s six-page job application without assistance. 146 Hoffman hired
Castro anyway, and he soon began earning the minimum wage while
cooking and mixing plastic formulas at Hoffman’s plant. 147
Seven months into Castro’s tenure at Hoffman, around Christmas 1988,
several employees tried to form a union.148 Castro joined the campaign and
solicited support from his coworkers. 149 When they caught wind of the
nascent union efforts, Hoffman’s managers began interrogating workers.150
One employee, Moises Gonzalez, identified Castro as a union leader.151
Several weeks later, Ronald Hoffman, the company president, laid off every
single organizer. 152 Hoffman argued that a decline in business caused the
layoffs, despite displaying a “Help Wanted” sign before the layoffs and
hiring new employees shortly thereafter. 153 The union lost the campaign
and the workers never organized. 154
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Hoffman had
illegally interrogated employees and discharged workers “in order to rid
itself of known union supporters.” 155 At a compliance hearing to determine
damages, Castro testified that he was born in Mexico and had used a
friend’s birth certificate to obtain employment at Hoffman. 156 Despite this
admission, the NLRB ordered Hoffman to pay Castro over $60,000 in
backpay. 157 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, issuing a landmark
decision that denied monetary remedies to unauthorized immigrants in labor
cases. 158
144. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants,
in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 408 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (noting
that Jose Castro’s real name may have been Samuel Perez).
145. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 409.
146. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 408 (summarizing Hoffman’s procedural
history).
147. Hoffman, 208 F.3d at 232.
148. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 102
(1992).
149. Id. at 108.
150. Id. at 106.
151. Id. at 108.
152. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 103.
154. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 410 (describing the workplace environment
at Hoffman following the Supreme Court’s decision).
155. Hoffman, 306 N.L.R.B. at 100.
156. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
157. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 141–42 (2002).
158. Id. at 151–52.
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None of the Supreme Court Justices uttered Jose Castro’s name during
oral argument. Instead, the two most common terms the Justices used to
refer to Castro were “the alien” and “the illegal alien.” 159 At one point in
the oral argument, one Justice used the adjective “illegal” as a noun,
referring to situations in which an “employer did not know that the
employee was an illegal, hence the employer was not violating the
immigration law.” 160
The Court went on to describe aliens as stealthy criminals. Unlike
Plyler, in which immigrants hide from exploitation, Hoffman’s immigrants
hide their criminality. The alien is a person who “conceal[s] the facts . . .
that he’s here illegally and has no right to work.” 161 This person tries to
“phony up more documents and . . . extend for the longest possible time the
charade that the worker is here lawfully . . . .” 162 He “subverts the
cornerstone” of immigration law, all the while “evading apprehension by
immigration authorities.” 163 At one point in oral argument, Justice Antonin
Scalia assumed the first-person voice of a crafty, lazy alien: “I can just sit
home and eat chocolates and get my back pay.” 164
The Court lamented the “massive problem of illegal immigration” in the
United States. 165 One Justice said that “we have to do something to reduce
this massive number of . . . illegal aliens.” 166 Seen from this vantage,
illegal immigration is a crisis that we, the citizens and victims of illegal
immigration, must address immediately.
A choice of frames is as important for the problems it overlooks as for
the problems it emphasizes. Although the Hoffman Court referred to Jose
Castro as an “illegal alien,” it could just as easily have labeled him a “union
organizer” or “discrimination victim.” Likewise, the Court could have
described the “massive problem” of “employee exploitation” or “blatant
unfair labor practices.” By choosing to describe illegal immigration not
only as a problem, but the problem, Ronald Hoffman’s obvious illegal
behavior became virtually irrelevant. Although Jose Castro was an illegal
alien, Ronald Hoffman was not an illegal employer.
The conceptual theory of metaphor holds that cognitive understandings
begin from basic, unmediated human experiences, which lead to the
formation of more abstract knowledge. 167 One such basic human
experience is the fear of criminal attack. By emphasizing the criminal
nature of Jose Castro’s wrongdoing and the need to “combat” aliens
159. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595),
2002 WL 77224. The Justices used the term “illegal alien” fifteen times and the term “alien”
ten times. No other term involving illegal immigration was used more than twice. Id.
160. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
163. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148–49 (emphasis added).
164. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 159, at 33.
165. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
167. Winter, supra note 26, at 1133 (arguing that the process of “motivation . . . makes
meaning possible”).
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“forcefully,” Hoffman’s metaphors draw upon this survival instinct.168
Aliens conceal their criminal activity by silently crossing the border and
tricking employers like Ronald Hoffman into giving them jobs. Aware of
the alien’s cunning ways, the Hoffman Court employed metaphors of
criminality to highlight the silent threat posed by illegal immigration.
C. Lopez-Mendoza: Immigrants as Toxic Waste
Many noncitizens could tell Adan Lopez-Mendoza’s immigration story.
At the age of twenty-four, Lopez-Mendoza left his family in Mexico to find
work in the United States and send small remittances home when he
could. 169 After departing from Mexico on foot, Lopez-Mendoza eventually
found a job at a transmission repair shop in San Mateo, California. 170
Several months after Lopez-Mendoza arrived in the United States, the
INS received a tip that seven unauthorized immigrants were employed at
the business where Lopez-Mendoza worked. 171 Believing they lacked
sufficient information to obtain a search warrant, two INS agents proceeded
directly to the repair shop without going to court. 172 One agent guarded the
building’s only exit, while the other agent spoke to the owner, Art
Bradley. 173 Bradley refused to grant the agents access to the shop, asking
instead that they return with a search warrant. Ignoring Bradley, one agent
entered the business and began questioning the workers. 174 According to
the agents, Lopez-Mendoza provided suspicious answers and was brought
to a local INS office for further questioning. There, he admitted that he had
entered the United States illegally. This confession eventually served as the
primary basis for Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation. 175
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the normal rules for excluding illegally obtained evidence in
criminal cases applied to civil deportation proceedings. 176 According to the
doctrinal metaphor in criminal law known as the “fruit of the poisonous
tree,” courts should not admit evidence discovered derivatively from illegal
searches, arrests, or interrogations. 177 The tainted evidence (i.e., the target
of the poisonous tree metaphor) is seen as diseased fruit that must be
discarded before it harms the judicial process.

168. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
169. See Joint Appendix at 117, 129, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (No.
83-491), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 209.
170. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035.
171. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *2, Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (No. 83-491), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1064.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id.
174. Id..
175. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035–36.
176. Id. at 1040–41; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–87 (1963)
(discussing the foundations of the exclusionary rule).
177. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1987) (discussing the exclusion
of derivative evidence); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982) (barring the admission
of confession obtained from illegal arrest).
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In a ruling that created the “illegal alien exception” to the exclusionary
rule, the Supreme Court declined to suppress Lopez-Mendoza’s
confession. 178 The Court concluded that although the exclusionary rule
might discourage police officers from engaging in misconduct, the same
prophylactic rationale carried little force in civil deportation proceedings.179
Beyond the legal significance of this holding, it is once again LopezMendoza’s metaphors that are most remarkable.
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor radically
altered the target domain of the poisonous tree metaphor. In contrast to
criminal cases, in which pieces of evidence are viewed as tainted fruit that
defile the courtroom, the metaphors of Lopez-Mendoza describe immigrants
as tainted bodies that defile the nation. As Justice O’Connor wrote:
Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should be
invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking
hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been
improperly obtained, or to compel police to return contraband explosives
or drugs to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized. 180

Thus, unlike criminal defendants who are viewed as victims of illegally
obtained evidence, Lopez-Mendoza presents immigrants as the objects of
taint. As Thomas Ross has observed: “To see something as ‘defiled’ is to
feel a special sense of the rightness, indeed the obligation, to cut it off, to
exclude it, at whatever cost.” 181 Drugs destroy the body. Hazardous waste
pollutes the environment. Lopez-Mendoza equates immigrants with these
toxic items. According to the Supreme Court’s metaphors, aliens are like
poisonous agents that should be removed from the national body
immediately.
Just as cleanup crews must do everything in their power to contain toxic
waste and protect society, so too must the Supreme Court contain
immigrants who would otherwise pollute the country. The task before the
Justices is imperative. The illegal alien problem is like “contraband
explosives” that could detonate at any time. 182 If something is not done
immediately, the alien bomb will blow up, destroying everything around it.
Organism metaphors describe the social community in terms of a
physical body. 183 Mapping concepts of health and life onto concepts of
country and society, Lopez-Mendoza’s organism metaphors describe the
178. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 396–400 (2003) (surveying examples of “anti-egalitarianism in Fourth
Amendment law”).
179. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044–46 (distinguishing between civil deportation
proceedings and criminal trials).
180. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
181. See Ross, supra note 73, at 1068 (explaining how the poisonous tree metaphor
connects readers to known realities).
182. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046.
183. Gerald V. O’Brien, Indigestible Food, Conquering Hordes, and Waste Materials:
Metaphors of Immigrants and the Early Immigration Restriction Debate in the United States,
18 METAPHOR & SYMBOL 33, 35–38 (2003) (discussing the prevalence of organism
metaphors in the immigration discourse of the early 1900s).

1568

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

poisonous effects of immigration.184 Just as infectious diseases threaten
our health, illegal aliens contaminate the social body. 185 The associations
created by these metaphors tie directly into our experiential understanding
of the world. We know that drugs endanger our well-being. When foreign
substances enter our bodies, our immune systems immediately attempt to
combat them. By comparing immigrants to drugs and toxic waste, LopezMendoza’s metaphors draw on the universal human desire to fend off
internal contaminants.186
As in previous immigration stories, Lopez-Mendoza speaks of the
“staggering dimension of the problem that the INS confronts.” 187 Unlike
Plyler’s metaphors that describe the scale of immigration in terms of
flooding, however, Lopez-Mendoza refers to the “massed numbers of
ascertainably illegal aliens” in terms of national health. 188 Lopez-Mendoza
proposes to remove the pollution of illegal immigration from the United
States by allowing courts to deport aliens with evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, organism metaphors empower
judges to overlook constitutional violations in order to purge the nation of
the contamination caused by illegal immigration.
D. Metaphors of Alienage, Floods, and Invasions
Consistent with the conceptual theory of metaphor, the foregoing
immigration stories contain rich figurative language tied to our embodied
understanding of the world. Plyler contains numerous water metaphors that
engage readers’ fear of drowning. Hoffman employs metaphors of crime
and attack that trigger self-defense instincts. Lopez-Mendoza describes a
national body polluted by immigrants. These cases not only establish basic
principles for the legal treatment of immigrants, they dictate how legal
actors talk and think about noncitizens.
Although these three stories are among the most important immigration
decisions in the modern era, they are rather unexceptional in the prominent
role metaphors play in their texts. Here I explain how these stories join a
much larger body of metaphors in the Supreme Court’s immigration
jurisprudence. By analyzing numerous metaphoric expressions in diverse
legal contexts, three conceptual metaphors emerge: IMMIGRANTS ARE
ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION.
1. Immigrants Are Aliens
“Alien” is the most dominant metaphor in all of immigration law. In
fact, lawyers and judges refer to “aliens” so frequently that few would
184. See Musolff, supra note 38, at 25–26 (examining the pervasiveness of such
mappings in political discourse).
185. See O’Brien, supra note 183, at 36 (arguing that modern societies adopt organism
metaphors because of their focus on public health and disease prevention).
186. See Musolff, supra note 38, at 28 (discussing the relationship between the concepts
of body, illness, and cure in Nazi rhetoric).
187. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1049 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 1049–50 (emphasis added).
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identify the word as a metaphor. This reaction is understandable.
Metaphors are traditionally viewed as simple comparisons between nonliteral concepts. So, for example, statements such as “the flood of
immigration” or “the immigrant invasion” are obvious metaphors because
they describe immigration in terms of something that it is not—a body of
water or an advancing army. In contrast to such “strong” metaphors, the
word “alien” appears to be definitional, rather than metaphoric. The INA
presents the term in this manner, defining “alien” as “any person not a
citizen or national of the United States.” 189 Stated mildly in the statutory
context, “alien” seems to be a neutral word that means simply “noncitizen.”
As such, the INA presents “alien” in profoundly unmetaphoric terms.
Despite this benign appearance, however, several metaphoric references
lie just beneath the surface. Here I employ the conceptual definition of
metaphor, rather than the traditional linguistic definition that involves an “A
is a B” format. 190 The theory of experientialism holds that human beings
formulate knowledge by drawing metaphoric associations between abstract
concepts and more meaningful concepts.191 As bridges between the
familiar and unfamiliar, metaphors serve as critical tools for understanding
the world. 192 In this way, “alien” is the central metaphor of immigration
law because it relies on a wide body of experiential knowledge—social,
cultural, and historical—to create meaning. The term is a metaphor not
because it involves a comparison between concepts—as the linguist
definition of metaphor holds—but because it serves as the primary vehicle
for mapping culturally embedded references onto the legal identity of
immigrants.
Words cannot be divorced from their culturally grounded meanings.
When legal actors speak of “aliens,” a series of qualities comes to mind
about the target group: aliens are nonhuman; aliens are illegal bordercrossers; and aliens are Mexicans. Those who doubt the metaphoric nature
of “alien” and reduce its meaning to simple statutory or definitional terms
assume a level of mutual exclusivity in language that does not exist.
“Alien” is both a metaphor and a statutory term. In addition to defining
immigrants as noncitizens in the INA, “alien” conveys three distinct
qualities: otherness, illegality, and ethnicity. The following sections
consider each of these metaphoric associations in turn.

189. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006); see also Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration
Laws, supra note 24, at 272 (describing “the blandness of the definition”).
190. See Rakova, supra note 64, at 217 (noting that the experientialist account challenges
the older definition of metaphor as a means of expressing similarity between concepts); see
also Calvert, supra note 36, at 547 (describing the traditional definition of metaphor).
191. See Rakova, supra note 64, at 216 (discussing the breadth and attractiveness of
experiential theory).
192. Petrie & Oshlag, supra note 54, at 589 (explaining how metaphors allow for the
transfer of meanings).
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a. Alien Is Other
The etymology of “alien” informs the modern use of the word. The
English definition of “alien” derives from the Old French word allien,
which means “strange, foreign,” and the Latin words alienus and alius,
which mean “of or belonging to another person or place,” “hostile,”
“strange,” and “other.” 193 Thus, according to early definitions, aliens are
dangerous others who are marked by their strangeness.
The contemporary definition of “alien,” reflects its origins:
A. adj. 1. gen. Belonging to another person, place, or family; strange,
foreign, not of one’s own . . . .
B. n. 1.a. A person belonging to another family, race, or nation; a
stranger, a foreigner. 194

From these definitions, American immigration law was born. Under the
Naturalization Act of 1790 only “free white person[s]” could naturalize
(i.e., escape from the unnatural state of alienage). 195 The Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798 allowed the president to remove aliens “judge[d]
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” 196 Multiple states
enacted Alien Land Laws in the early 1900s out of fear of competition from
aliens. 197 The Alien Registration Act of 1940 expanded the grounds for
deporting immigrants engaged in subversive activities. 198 All of this alienspecific legislation reflected a conceptual understanding of aliens that
matched the word’s etymology. Because aliens were defined as “hostile”
and “strange,” early legislatures enacted laws to protect citizens from the
other-worldly threat depicted by these metaphoric representations.
The same dehumanizing associations presented in the statutory context
(i.e., strangeness, hostility, and otherness) appear in contemporary judicial
decisions as well. Several variations of the Supreme Court’s alien
metaphors emphasize the nonhuman qualities of immigrants:

193. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989); WALTER W. SKEAT, AN
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 13 (1968); see also ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, Alien, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=alien.
194. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989).
195. Naturalization Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104, repealed by Act of Jan.
29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414.
196. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798); HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES 18–19 (2006) (discussing the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798).
197. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT
38–40 (3d. ed. 2006) (explaining the effects of Alien Land Laws on immigrant
communities); Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten
Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7 (1947) (discussing differences between various Alien Land
Laws).
198. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 83 (2004) (explaining the political and substantive
effects of the Alien Registration Act).

2011]

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHERNESS

1571

[T]he alien must first either surrender to the INS for deportation or wait
for the INS to catch him and commence a deportation proceeding . . . . 199
[T]he Government may continue to detain an alien who still remains here
or release that alien under supervision. 200
Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal
aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect of
such inquiries [slows] their movement and [makes] them more vulnerable
to detection by roving patrols. 201

Thus, in certain instances, the Supreme Court employs dehumanizing
metaphors to describe aliens as animals that are caught and released. In
other Court opinions, dehumanization occurs by describing aliens as
creatures from outer space. Extraterrestrials are the ultimate nonhumans.
Recognizing the ability of “alien” to convey foreignness, science fiction
writers co-opted the word in the mid-twentieth century. 202 Born in a
foreign galaxy, space creatures do not eat our food or breathe our air; they
possess fewer human qualities than even animals on Earth. At times, the
Court has described immigrants in this way:
[T]he relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has
been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. 203

Empirical data discussed in detail below show that “alien” and “illegal
alien” are by far the most common terms used to refer to immigrants in the
law. 204 Because metaphors connect listeners to deeply embedded cultural
knowledge, the repeated use of “alien” in legal texts unavoidably triggers
readers’ inclinations to associate aliens with extraterrestrials. For example,
the Court frequently employs the metaphor ALIENS ARE INVADERS to
discuss immigration. 205 According to popular science fiction narratives,
extraterrestrials seek to dominate the universe.206 As a method for creating
multiple, overlapping correspondences, the invasion metaphor relates
simultaneously to popular images of space creatures attempting to overtake
the galaxy, as well as more conventional notions of warfare. By connecting
readers to this cultural imagery, the Court’s alien metaphors present

199. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (emphasis added).
200. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted).
201. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 471 n.15 (1990) (emphasis added).
202. See 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989); see also Leighton B.
Cooke, The Human Alien: In-Groups and Outbreeding in Enemy Mine, in ALIENS: THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SCIENCE FICTION 179, 181 (George E. Slusser & Eric S. Rabkin eds.,
1987) (explaining how popular science fiction stories often express xenophobic attitudes).
203. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (emphasis added).
204. See infra Part II.D.1.b and accompanying Figures 1 and 2 (presenting empirical data
on alien terminology in federal court opinions).
205. See infra Part II.D.3 (examining different permutations of invasion metaphors in
Supreme Court opinions).
206. STEPHANIE CARVIN & STUART JILL, SCIENCE FICTION OR SCIENCE FANTASY? THE
GENDERED PORTRAYAL OF ALIENS AND THE DISCOURSE OF DOMINANCE IN OUTER SPACE 3,
presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, Ill.
(Feb. 28, 2007) (discussing stories of invasion contained in science fiction accounts).
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immigrants not only as invaders from foreign countries, but also as
nonhuman aggressors from foreign worlds.
Metaphors can dehumanize through direct comparisons to nonhumans,
such as animals or space creatures, or by refusing to ascribe human qualities
to immigrants. 207 Such attribute-based metaphors dehumanize immigrants
by presenting aliens as inanimate objects that are transported and pulled by
outside forces:
[T]he general purpose of the immigration statute’s employment
prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a
magnet pulls illegal immigrants toward the United States . . . . 208
[M]any Mexicans being imported into this country . . . . 209
[Respondent] and respondent[’s] wife paid a professional smuggler $450
to transport them into this country . . . . 210
[S]he had attempted to smuggle aliens for gain. 211

As nonhuman things, aliens can be pulled, smuggled, or transported,
much like boxes of books or cases of wine. The law does not extend
personal rights to such goods. According to these metaphors, aliens should
be controlled and regulated in the same manner as other articles of
commerce.
Another form of attribute-based dehumanization in Supreme Court texts
presents aliens as dangerous diseases. Much like Lopez-Mendoza’s
reference to aliens as hazardous waste and drugs, these organism metaphors
describe immigrants as health risks:
Illegal aliens pose a potential health hazard to the community since many
seek work as nursemaids, food handlers, cooks, housekeepers, waiters,
dishwashers, and grocery workers. 212
Congress recognized that the influx of foreign infectious diseases, mass
immigration coupled with poor housing and sanitation, hunger, and
malnutrition had taken their toll. 213
[T]he flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized
study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible
carrier of illegal aliens. 214

207. See Steve Loughnan et al., Understanding the Relationship Between Attribute-Based
and Metaphor-Based Dehumanization, 12 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 747, 747–
49 (2009) (examining different methods of dehumanization).
208. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
209. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 902 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal.
1973)).
210. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 (1985) (emphasis added).
211. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 30 (1982) (emphasis added).
212. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 903 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(quoting Baca, 368 F. Supp. at 398).
213. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 532 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
214. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (emphasis added).
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Much as diseases enter the body, aliens enter the country and quickly
spread throughout communities. Through attribute-based dehumanizing
metaphors, the Supreme Court presents illegal immigration as a form of
public health emergency that justifies aggressive containment measures.215
According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, the process of mapping
qualities from source domains onto target domains is always partial and
incomplete. 216 The aspects of each domain obscured by a particular
metaphor remain a crucial (yet concealed) function of this mapping process.
By presenting immigrants as animals, diseases, and inanimate objects, the
metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS conceals immigrants’ personhood and
potential for social contribution. The metaphor brings focus to images of
foreignness and otherness, producing a narrowly focused picture of
nonhumans who can never belong.
b. Alien Is Illegal
The metaphoric image of illegal aliens is omnipresent in law. To
demonstrate the metaphoric association between immigrants and illegality,
this Article presents original empirical data on alienage terminology in legal
opinions. The data derives from post-1965 federal court decisions that
contain any combination of three adjectives (“illegal,” “undocumented,”
and “unauthorized”) and three nouns (“immigrant,” “alien,” and
“noncitizen”). 217 The study produced 4200 instances of separate adjectivenoun combinations. As Figure 1 indicates, “illegal alien” was by far the
most common term, appearing in 69% of opinions (2905 cases). No other
term appeared in more than 10% of opinions, except “undocumented alien,”
which accounted for 16% of the results in 670 cases. Distinguishing
between the nouns “alien,” “immigrant,” and “noncitizen” in the data set,
judges used “alien” in 88% of opinions (3706 cases), while “immigrant”
appeared in only 12% of opinions (494 cases).

215. See O’Brien, supra note 13, at 36 (examining metaphors that involve harm to
national health).
216. See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations
Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2002) (describing metaphor as a complex
mapping process).
217. These data were generated from a textual search on Westlaw conducted on January
6, 2010. The search consisted of all federal court opinions that appeared in the following
Westlaw databases: All U.S. Supreme Court Cases (SCT), Reported U.S. Court of Appeals
Cases (CTAR), and Reported U.S. District Court Cases (DCTR). The search contained the
singular and plural versions of the following terms: “illegal alien,” “undocumented alien,”
“unauthorized alien,” “illegal immigrant,” “undocumented immigrant,” “unauthorized
immigrant,” “illegal noncitizen,” “undocumented noncitizen,” and “unauthorized
noncitizen.” Opinions that contained more than one search term (e.g., both “illegal alien”
and “undocumented immigrant”) were counted as separate instances in the data set. Multiple
appearances of the same term within an opinion, as well as plural and singular versions of
the same term within an opinion, were counted as one instance in the data set.
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Figure 1: Data on “Illegal Alien” in Federal Cases

The prevalence of “illegal alien” in legal opinions is extraordinary given
that the law provides no clear definition of the term. 218 Although “illegal
alien” is often used to refer to people who overstay their visas or enter the
country without inspection, there are several scenarios in which these
immigrants may remain lawfully in the United States. For example, many
of the people described as “illegal aliens” have family connections,
community ties, or legitimate fears of persecution that entitle them to
discretionary relief.219 But when courts use “illegal alien” as a descriptive
term, these rights have rarely been adjudicated. As Beth Lyon has noted,
referring to such people as “illegal aliens” is equivalent to referring to
defendants awaiting trial as “convicted criminals.” 220 Although lay
audiences may not grasp this distinction, federal judges should.

218. See Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws, supra note 24, at 276; Karl
Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939,
949 n.61 (1995) (describing “illegal alien” as a term “unknown to federal immigration law”);
Neuman, supra note 24, at 1440–41 (arguing that the catch-all phrase “illegal alien” fails to
account for the variable contexts of unauthorized immigration).
219. See Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws, supra note 24, at 276–78;
Neuman, supra note 24, at 1440–41 (describing situations in which unauthorized immigrants
may assert valid claims to remain in the United States).
220. Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering
U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 576
(2004).
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Even Supreme Court Justices overlook basic notions of due process when
describing “illegal aliens.” For instance, in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme
Court wrote: “The constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free,
but we have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the
commission of an ongoing crime.” 221 Remarkably, the Court conceded that
the person described in the above passage as a “criminal” had never been
convicted of any crime. 222 Because the immigrant in Lopez-Mendoza was
an “alien,” however, the Justices simply presumed that he had engaged in
criminal wrongdoing even though no court had ruled as such.
Figure 2: Data on “Alien” in Federal Cases

In addition to ignoring the nuanced nature of immigration status, the
illegal alien metaphor distorts the severity of an immigrant’s offense. For
example, entering the country without inspection (i.e., crossing the border
illegally) is a first-time misdemeanor that federal officials rarely
prosecute. 223 Further, nearly half of all people described as “illegal aliens”
obtained their “illegal” status by overstaying valid visas—a civil
immigration violation that involves no criminal conduct whatsoever.224
221. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1984) (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 1047 n.3; see also In re Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925, 168 (INS Oct. 7,
1977) (“There is nothing in the record to show that he has any criminal record.”).
223. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006); Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or by Crook: Exploring the
Legality of an INS Sting Operation, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 813, 823 n.39 (1994) (discussing
criminal prosecutions of immigration-related crimes).
224. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2006); Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the
Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 143-44 (2009); see also
Manheim, supra note 218, at 949 n.61 (noting that many people described as “illegal aliens”
have committed only civil immigration violations).
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Nevertheless, the language of alienage equates these misdemeanors and
non-criminal acts with serious crimes:
[T]he minivan was registered to an address . . . north of the border in an
area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling. 225
[I]t seems that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is powerless to
stop the tide of illegal aliens—and dangerous drugs—that daily and
freely crosses our 2,000-mile southern boundary. 226

If “illegal” means “criminal” and “alien” means “stranger,” then through
the illegal alien metaphor, immigrants become criminal strangers. As
such, the illegal alien metaphor presents immigrants as more than mere
border-crossers; like murderers, robbers, and drug dealers, they threaten the
social order.
Once understood as “illegal aliens,” immigrants garner little sympathy
from a public accustomed to punishing its convicts. A society that
constantly seeks to separate the “wicked” from the “righteous” relies on the
sorting function provided by the illegal frame. 227 If a crime has been
committed, then arrests must be made, convictions obtained, and penalties
assessed. 228
The conflation of source and target domains encouraged by the illegal
alien metaphor fuels a growing public distrust of both authorized and
unauthorized immigrants. 229 Based on the popular misconception that most
immigrants lack legal status, over fifty percent of Americans want to reduce
all levels of immigration, legal and illegal.230 As a proxy for criminality
and immigration in general, the illegal alien metaphor fosters
misunderstandings about the scope of illegal immigration and the
appropriate responses to the perceived problem. 231

225. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 271 (2002) (emphasis added).
226. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 899, 899 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
227. See Duncan, supra note 90, at 793 (discussing images of “criminal contamination” in
American law).
228. See Johnson, supra note 66, at 868 (describing social responses to metaphorical
frames involving crime).
229. See Knud S. Larsen et al., Threat Perception and Attitudes Toward Documented and
Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Framing the Debate and Conflict
Resolution, 7 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 115, 116 (2009) (examining public fears of authorized and
unauthorized immigrants).
230. Deenesh Sohoni, The ‘Immigrant Problem’: Modern-Day Nativism on the Web, 54
CURRENT SOC. 827, 829 (2006) (discussing social attitudes toward immigrants). Roughly
two-thirds of immigrants reside legally in the United States. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera
Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr.: Trends in Unauthorized Immigration, Undocumented Inflow Now
Trails Legal Inflow ii (2008), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/94.pdf; see
also Capps, supra note 88, at 170 (estimating that at least thirty percent of immigrants lack
legal status).
231. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 2–3 (2004) (arguing that the presence of a large number of unauthorized
immigrants within Asian and Latino communities creates a perception that members of those
communities are illegitimate).
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According to cognitive linguists, metaphors are more likely to mislead
listeners when they are repeated and accepted without evaluation. 232 As
George Lakoff, the pioneer of conceptual metaphor theory, states, “The
things most alive in our conceptual system are those things that we use
constantly, unconsciously, and automatically.” 233 But metaphors that
appear “dead” are in fact very much alive in our minds, silently influencing
our perceptions of people and concepts. Illegal alien is one such metaphor.
Through constant, uncritical repetition, the illegal alien metaphor has
transformed immigrants into a monolithic group of criminal strangers who
must be captured, convicted, and expelled.
c. Alien Is Mexican
The immigration laws of the United States have been marred by a long
history of racist restrictions. 234 From Chinese exclusion, to bans on
“undesirable races” from Europe, to a host of other racial and ethnic
barriers, immigration laws during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
exhibited an undeniable preoccupation with race.235 Much like the
explicitly racist language of the past, today’s illegal alien remains a highly
racialized figure.
Although “illegal alien” could theoretically refer to any group of
immigrants, the term has a much tighter racial focus. In contemporary legal
discourse, references to “illegal aliens” facilitate a coded discussion on
immigration that—rather than involving immigrants in general—focuses on
Mexicans in particular 236:

232. See Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1382 (warning against the
uncritical use of metaphors).
233. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO
POETIC METAPHOR 62 (1989).
234. See generally DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES
MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS 205–07 (2008) (summarizing race-based
exclusions in early immigration laws); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a
Transnational Age, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2008) (discussing the ideology of AngloSaxon superiority embedded in the Supreme Court’s early immigration decisions).
235. See MOTOMURA, supra note 196, at 121–32 (summarizing the history of racial
restrictions in immigration law); NGAI, supra note 231, at 17–55 (examining the racial
restrictions embedded in American immigration law and policy from 1924 to 1965); Kevin
R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1543 (1995) (discussing immigration
status and ethnicity); Ediberto Román, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 841, 872–81
(2008) (discussing the racial effects of immigration laws during the twentieth century).
236. See NGAI, supra note 231, at 2–3, 264 (discussing the close relationship between
illegal status and race); Neuman, supra note 24, at 1429 n.17 (examining the role race played
in early immigration restrictions); Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate
Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 36–37 (1996) (examining
the race-based objectives of pre-1965 immigration policies); see also KENT A. ONO & JOHN
M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS: RHETORIC, IMMIGRATION, AND CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION
187, at 40 (2002) (discussing popular media images of a “generalized brown figure
encroaching from the south”).
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The net effect of this silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico is
suffering by the aliens . . . . 237
These local problems are particularly acute in California in light of the
significant influx . . . of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico. 238

Like metaphors of criminality that distort the nature of an immigrant’s
wrongdoing, the illegal alien metaphor suggests that the unauthorized
immigrant population is entirely composed of Mexican residents. But this
is simply not the case. For example, the two Supreme Court passages listed
above were written in the mid-1970s, at a time when nearly half of
unauthorized immigrants came from countries other than Mexico.239
Although immigration from Mexico represented a substantial proportion of
the unauthorized population, the “invasion” from Mexico described in those
passages simply did not exist. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
employed the illegal alien frame to describe a massive number of aliens
approaching from the south:
Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,000-mile border, is
readily available and virtually uncontrollable. 240
[T]he colossal problem presented by illegal entries from Mexico. 241

Although the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants has increased
substantially in recent decades,242 thus making the metaphor’s associations
more “accurate,” the illegal alien metaphor has never been concerned with
conveying a true picture of real demographics.
Citizens and immigrants alike are affected by the racial and ethnic
implications of the illegal alien frame. Just as the alien metaphor merges
every immigrant category into one, thereby raising public opposition to all
forms of immigration, the illegal alien metaphor merges all Latino residents
into one group of unauthorized outsiders. Historian Mae Ngai describes
“alien citizenship” as the concept of existing as a foreigner in one’s own
country. 243 Thus, although they reside legally in the United States,
naturalized citizens remain presumptive foreigners within American society
because of the immutability of their alien citizenship status.244 By
transferring qualities of criminality and otherness to residents based on
237. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 904 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973)).
238. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (emphasis added).
239. Robert Warren & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of
Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census, 24 DEMOGRAPHY 375, 380
(1987) (estimating that from 1960 to 1975, 1,116,000 people immigrated to the United States
illegally, 571,000 (51%) of whom were from Mexico).
240. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
241. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 n.5 (1982) (emphasis added).
242. In 2008, 7 million unauthorized immigrants from Mexico resided in the United
States, as compared to 4.9 million unauthorized immigrants from other countries. Passel &
Cohn, supra note 230, at 3–5.
243. NGAI, supra note 231, at 8 (arguing that the experience of Asian and Latino
immigrants should be understood within the context of exclusionary racial quotas and
colonialism).
244. Id. at 2.
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ethnicity, the illegal alien metaphor brands Latino residents as
unassimilable foreigners who remain ineligible to attain full membership in
society, regardless of their legal status. 245
The Supreme Court established a direct link between “alien” and
“Mexican” in Rosales-Lopez v. United States. 246 That case involved a
criminal defendant charged with “smuggling” people into the United States
from Mexico. 247 The defense sought to ask prospective jurors about any
personal biases they held against Mexican immigrants. 248 The presiding
judge disallowed the question, instead asking: “Do any of you have any
feelings about the alien problem at all?” 249 On review, the Supreme Court
held that asking about “the alien problem” was equivalent to asking about
Mexican immigration. 250 According to the Supreme Court, because “alien”
meant “Mexican,” the presiding judge did not have to utter the word
“Mexican” in order for the jury to comprehend the reference. In other
words, because every juror understood that the “alien problem” was the
“Mexican problem,” no further inquiry was necessary. This association
was possible only because of the racial code provided by the illegal alien
metaphor.
American society no longer sanctions racist language in legal discourse.
Because “illegal alien” is facially ambiguous, however, the term enables
speakers to express racialized concerns in a race-neutral way. 251 Society
will accept Supreme Court Justices who are “anti-crime” or “anti-illegal
immigration,” but will reject those Justices viewed as “anti-Mexican.” 252
As such, the code provided by the illegal alien metaphor enables a silent
transfer of meaning without the social sanction that would otherwise
accompany more overt language. 253
As discussed above, conceptual metaphors are most likely to conflate
subject and target domains when describing people and social
movements. 254 No longer seen as figurative, the metaphor becomes
mistaken for a semi-literal representation of a target group.255 The illegal
245. See Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 575–
77 (2007) (criticizing the view of immigrants as “racialized others overburdened with
culture”).
246. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
247. Id. at 184–85 (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 185.
249. Id. at 185–88 (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 193 (“There can be no doubt that the jurors would have understood a question
about aliens to at least include Mexican aliens.”).
251. See generally Phyllis Pease Chock, Ambiguity in Policy Discourse: Congressional
Talk About Immigration, 28 POL’Y SCI. 165 (1995) (examining the racial codes of
immigration rhetoric).
252. Robert Short & Lisa Magana, Political Rhetoric, Immigration Attitudes, and
Contemporary Prejudice: A Mexican American Dilemma, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 702–
03 (2002) (arguing that anti-immigrant labels avoid the psychological burdens associated
with explicitly racist discourse).
253. See O’Brien, supra note 183, at 44 (explaining how inhumane social policies often
follow dehumanizing rhetoric).
254. See supra Part I (examining personal and doctrinal metaphors).
255. Duncan, supra note 90, at 795.
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alien metaphor achieves this end by transferring meaning from alien to
criminal to Mexican. 256 These associations are difficult to recognize,
however, because their definitions derive from unspoken racial codes.
What emerges in legal texts is an essentialized understanding of immigrants
as dangerous things that are infused with ethnicity. 257 Just as the root word
alienus means “hostile” or “other,” the term “illegal alien” presents
immigrants as racialized outsiders who are unable to contribute to a
common social endeavor.
2. Immigration Is a Flood
Conceptual metaphors often describe social changes in terms of moving
objects. 258 According to these metaphors, just as we cannot control the
speed or direction of some physical forces, we cannot control changes in
our lives and communities.259 For example, some people might say that the
country is “sliding into disaster” 260 or “the winds of change are blowing.”
The Supreme Court frequently frames immigration in this way, describing
the movement of people across borders as an uncontrollable body of water
that harms the nation.
The metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD involves three distinct
characteristics of immigration: direction, size, and force. With regard to
direction, the Supreme Court’s metaphors depict a northward immigrant
stream:
[T]he “formidable law enforcement problems” posed by the northbound
tide of illegal entrants into the United States. 261
[S]temming the flow of illegal aliens along the Mexican-American
border . . . . 262

These metaphors suggest that most immigrants flow into the United
States without first obtaining authorization at the border. Once again,
immigration demographics do not bear out the metaphor’s implications.
Forty-five percent of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States
entered the country legally; 263 they did not gush into the country as the
256. See Lisa A. Flores, Constructing Rhetorical Borders: Peons, Illegal Aliens, and
Competing Narratives of Immigration, 20 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 362, 363 (2003)
(discussing metaphors of immigration and criminality).
257. See Joo, supra note 216, at 799 (noting that the “essentialized part” of a domain may
appear to represent the whole).
258. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 136 (examining the conceptual metaphor “changes are
movements”).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551–54 (1976)).
262. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 899, 902 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal.
1973)).
263. PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION 1 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf (estimating
that up to forty-five percent of unauthorized immigrants enter the country on a valid visa but
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flood metaphor suggests, but instead came to the country on valid visas that
later expired. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court describes unauthorized
immigrants as a monolithic group of border-crossers that approaches from
Mexico in an overwhelming fashion:
[T]he presence of large numbers of undocumented aliens in this country
creates law enforcement problems of titanic proportions. 264
[T]he vast tide of illegal immigration that had produced a shadow
population of literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United
States. 265
With . . . the facilities at Guantanamo and available Coast Guard cutters
saturated, . . . the Government could no longer . . . protect our
borders . . . . 266

The Court’s many references to massive flows 267 and influxes 268 are too
numerous to list. Just as levies attempt to hold back large bodies of water,
the border is presented as a fragile dike that might burst at any moment,
given the pressure coming from the alien flood:
The entire system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or
stemming this heavy flow; and its costs, including added burdens on the
courts, have been substantial. 269
[T]he flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the
border. 270

The unrestrained immigrant flood portends dangerous social change.271
The immigrant waves described in Supreme Court opinions appear as
foreboding bodies that submerge everything in their path, including
American culture. As Justice Rehnquist wrote, aliens are not like
naturalized citizens who have adjusted “to our patterns of living and
attitudes, and have demonstrated a basic understanding of our institutions,
system of government, history, and traditions.” 272 Instead, as Justice Lewis
overstay or otherwise violate a condition of entry); see also Johnson, supra note 235, at 1546
(discussing misperceptions about the number of illegal border-crossers residing in the United
States).
264. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 239 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
265. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 481 (1991) (emphasis added)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
266. Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 163 (1993) (emphasis added).
267. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 296 (1993) (emphasis added) (describing the
“increased flow of unaccompanied juvenile aliens into California”).
268. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985) (emphasis added) (discussing
attempts to control the “influx of undocumented aliens”); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal
458 U.S. 858, 876 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (discussing the
“tremendous influx of illegal aliens”).
269. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
270. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (emphasis added).
271. See Jonathan Charteris-Black, Britain as a Container: Immigration Metaphors in
the 2005 Election Campaign, 17 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 563, 572–73 (2006) (discussing water
metaphors in political discourse).
272. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 662 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Powell said, aliens bring “significant economic and social problems” with
them. 273 Water is supposed to cleanse and give life. 274 But the immigrant
surge in Supreme Court opinions is a brown tide that immerses the
American way of life. 275
According to cognitive linguists, much of human reasoning derives from
basic physical and social interactions. 276 Floods constitute a core
component of this embodied knowledge. Great floods have devastated
societies throughout human history. In addition, people possess a keen
sense of rivers and tides based on their knowledge of the physical world.277
Drawing on these associations, the Supreme Court’s water metaphors
emphasize the dangers of a growing immigrant population.
Although they would like to right our national ship before it capsizes, the
Justices are nihilistic in their figurative accounts of immigration, describing
a nation saturated by an uncontrolled flow of aliens. 278 According to the
Court’s water metaphors, the immigrant wave is too massive and the federal
government is too inept for citizens to hold back the alien surge.
3. Immigration Is an Invasion
Human beings instinctively fear outside physical threats. Throughout
recorded history, nations have built walls and raised armies in response to
real and perceived enemies. There are few, if any, aspects of our embodied
experience more central than self-defense.
Drawing on this social, historical, and cultural knowledge, we often
explain foreign concepts in terms of battle. Consider the following
conceptual metaphors and their linguistic tokens: POLITICS IS WAR 279 (“The
fight erupted over abortion”), 280 ARGUMENT IS WAR (“I couldn’t defend that
point”), 281 and SPORT IS WAR (“My team did not use the right strategy”).282
Reflecting the centrality of war metaphors in human thought, the Supreme
Court often describes immigration in terms of invasion.

273. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
274. See Duncan, supra note 90, at 749 (explaining how the image of water plays a
central role in metaphors of crime control).
275. See generally OTTO SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 65–155 (2002) (analyzing the use of water
metaphors in recent immigration debates in California); Santa Ana et al., supra note 51, at
152–53 (arguing that water metaphors mask the individuality and humanity of immigrants).
276. Winter, supra note 26, at 1130–31.
277. Charteris-Black, supra note 271, at 570–71 (arguing that water metaphors often
describe an increase in the rate of immigration).
278. Santa Ana et al., supra note 51, at 154–56 (explaining how water metaphors portray
the nation as a sinking boat).
279. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 22, 62, 94.
280. Id. at 22.
281. Id. at 80.
282. Id. at 75.
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Mirroring popular media accounts of an “alien invasion,” 283 the Supreme
Court’s metaphoric wars present immigrants as aggressors who threaten
national sovereignty 284:
Congress [is] vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of
protecting our borders. 285
[W]e leave no unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor. 286
The deployment of border patrol agents along the border . . .
maximize[s] . . . personnel, with the first line of defense being called the
“line watch.” 287

At times the Supreme Court’s war metaphors depict aliens engaged in
direct conflict. At other times, however, the intruders approach silently:
[T]he evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the mark of
undocumented status . . . . 288
[I]llegal entrants from Mexico pose[] formidable law enforcement
problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. 289

Through these metaphors, immigrants appear as guerrilla warriors who
hide and wait to attack. The battles in the Court’s metaphoric wars will
cease only when the foreign invaders surrender:
In attempting to protect California’s fiscal interests . . . from the
deleterious effects on its economy . . . [the statute] . . . is tailored to
combat effectively the perceived evils. 290
[M]ost aliens . . . can ensure themselves review in courts of appeals only
if they voluntarily surrender themselves for deportation. 291

In addition to depicting conventional and guerilla warfare, the Court also
employs metaphors that describe a more exotic attack involving female
immigrants overtaking the nation through reproduction. These fertility
metaphors depict unauthorized immigrant women as people who wish to
conquer the United States by bearing American citizens:
[D]eportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously
produce new and material facts . . . . 292
283. See generally Román, supra note 235, at 843–55 (challenging media descriptions of
an “alien invasion”).
284. See Leo R. Chávez, Public Discourse, Immigration, and Control of the U.S.-Mexico
Border: Reflections on Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey’s “The Costs of
Contradiction: US Border Policy 1986–2000”, 1 LATINO STUD. 253, 255 (2003) (discussing
media depictions of immigrants as hostile invaders).
285. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added);
see also Michigan v. Summers 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981) (emphasis added) (describing the
“difficulty in patrolling the long Mexican border”).
286. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695–96 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953)) (internal quotations omitted).
287. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 907 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
288. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
289. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976) (emphasis added).
290. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (emphasis added).
291. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 480 (1991) (emphasis added).
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[S]he managed to become the actual parent of a United States citizen by
conceiving and bearing an illegitimate child here. 293
[M]ore significant demographic or economic [problems] . . . are
engendered by the illegal entry into the State of entire families of aliens
for indefinite periods than by the periodic sojourns of single
adults . . . . 294

The female alien does not use force to overtake the country. Rather she
utilizes her superior reproductive power to attain conquest. 295 By
manipulating American law to achieve power, the female alien is a clever
invader who relies on legal technicalities to gain advantage.
These fertility metaphors feed into larger debates over jus soli, or
birthright citizenship, in which opponents frequently express fears about the
changing racial demographics of the country. 296 According to the fertility
frame, the nation can accept single men who will work temporarily in the
United States without bringing their culture and traditions with them. But
the nation cannot bear the social consequences that come with importing
entire families who will reside in our communities, study in our schools,
and worship in our churches. If the fertile invader is not thwarted soon, her
massed offspring will overtake the nation. As such, the fertility metaphor
presents the loss of cultural hegemony as the most dangerous consequence
of the alien invasion.
Whether the attack is by stealth, invasion, or reproduction, the Supreme
Court’s war metaphors share a common theme: America is under assault
by a different kind of enemy. Through metaphor, Supreme Court Justices
become protectors of a nation besieged by an ominous alien attack.
III. TOWARD A NEW IMMIGRATION DISCOURSE
Words affect thought, and thought affects action. As demonstrated
above, the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions are filled with evocative
words that fuse the concept of immigration with notions of criminality,
devastation, and attack. Here I consider the consequences of these
associations and propose an alternative account. Just as cognitive linguists
challenged the traditional description of metaphors as minor poetic
flourishes, I challenge the notion that the Supreme Court’s metaphors are
nothing more than insignificant textual ornaments.
292. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143 n.5 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting
Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting)).
293. INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 226 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
294. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 249 n.10 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
295. See O’Brien, supra note 13, at 39 (analyzing immigration rhetoric that focuses on
different birth rates among immigrants and citizens).
296. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and
Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 709–13
(1995) (discussing the racial dynamic of birthright citizenship debates); Gerald L. Neuman,
Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 499–500 (1987) (reviewing PETER H.
SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT (1985)) (arguing that much of
the debate over jus soli can be traced to issues of race and culture).
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This section begins by comparing the Supreme Court’s metaphors to the
metaphors of immigration policy. Whether Congress is building a virtual
fence, requiring tamperproof identification cards, or sanctioning the mass
incarceration of aliens, each step can be understood in terms of the
metaphors discussed above.
The conceptual theory of metaphor explains why Congress legislates
metaphorically in the same way that the Supreme Court rules
metaphorically. Because meaning is culturally grounded, the social
construction of immigrants depends on numerous voices coming from
multiple cultural institutions such as Congress and the Supreme Court. No
one institution is an exclusive or independent source of social meaning.
Through metaphors, Congress, the Court, and other cultural bodies facilitate
a discussion among lawyers, commentators, and legislators about “the
immigration crisis” and the proposed responses to the crisis. 297 Thus, the
Court’s metaphoric choices do far more than reflect popular understandings
of immigration. By appropriating, repackaging, and circulating certain
immigration metaphors, the Court joins other cultural institutions in
creating a dominant account of who immigrants are and how they should be
treated. 298
The Article concludes by considering opportunities for discursive
change. I offer the concepts of migration and economic sanctuary as
alternative metaphors for understanding immigration.
The idea of
migration focuses on the movement of people, rather than on an invasion of
aliens. Likewise, the idea of economic sanctuary presents immigration as a
product of trade and structural adjustment policies, rather than as a product
of simple criminal intent.
These metaphors highlight immigrants’
personhood and potential for economic cooperation—characteristics
concealed by current accounts.
A. Metaphors of Immigration Reform
Cognitive linguists speak of “entailments” as additional information that
listeners logically adopt from metaphors.299 As such, entailments are
underspecified pieces of knowledge that emerge naturally from conceptual
metaphors. 300 For example, the metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD
directly maps information about the size and power of floods, while
indirectly entailing additional information that listeners associate with
floods. Thus, we know that communities raise levies against floods and
that floodwaters carry disease. When lawmakers understand a problem in
metaphoric terms, they often formulate policies based on these metaphoric
entailments. Therefore, a metaphor’s entailments are as important, if not
297. LAKOFF & FERGUSON, supra note 32, at 1–2 (arguing that the “immigrant problem”
could also be understood as a “foreign policy problem” or a “trade problem”).
298. See Briggs, supra note 14, at 272 (explaining how meaning derives from
“appropriation and reception”).
299. See Hunter, supra note 39, at 471–72 (arguing that the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A
JOURNEY entails that people may face roadblocks or spin their wheels at times).
300. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 94–95 (defining metaphoric entailments).
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more important, than the information utilized directly in the mapping
process. 301
The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors—alien, flood, and
invasion—contain several entailments that are reflected in contemporary
immigration policies. Consider the recent debate over immigration reform.
The last serious congressional attempt to alter the nation’s immigration
laws contained three core proposals: enhanced border security, an
expanded guestworker program, and amnesty for the nearly twelve million
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States. 302
Each component of immigration reform can be seen as an entailment of
the metaphors discussed above. For example, the alien metaphor is evident
in proposals to modify the nation’s guestworker system. A new
guestworker program would import hundreds of thousands of workers into
the United States each year.303 Advocates of this proposal promise that
guestworkers will work in the United States several years and then return
home. The description of immigrants as temporary visitors situates the
nation as a family and aliens as guests of the family. 304 “Aliens” are
defined as people “belonging to another . . . family.” 305 When a guest
arrives at a family’s house, the family controls the conditions of the guest’s
residency; the guest is told where to sleep and how long to stay. According
to the vision fostered by the guestworker proposal, aliens will express
gratitude to the nation by making food for their hosts, cleaning their homes,
and washing their dishes. Because they are aliens (i.e., strangers to the
national family), the guests cannot stay indefinitely. Once their temporary
stay is over, the alien guests will leave politely and make room for other
guests to begin work in the United States.306 This image of foreign-born
guests working in the national house becomes possible only when
immigrants are first understood as alien strangers.
As discussed above, the alien metaphor conceals the humanity of
immigrants. The mapping of nonhuman qualities onto immigrants was
evident in Congress’s attempt to prevent unauthorized immigrants from
obtaining driver’s licenses in the REAL ID Act of 2005. 307 Drawing on the
301. Simon, supra note 85, at 1041 (discussing the importance of entailments).
302. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.
(introduced May 9, 2007); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th
Cong. (passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006); JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW
HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES ii (2009),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=107 (estimating that 11.9
million unauthorized immigrants live in the United States); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law
After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1446–47 (2008) (examining immigration reform
proposals).
303. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 219–20
(2007) (analyzing recent guestworker proposals).
304. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 62 (discussing the metaphor SOCIETY IS A FAMILY).
305. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989).
306. See Rodríguez, supra note 305, at 220–22 (discussing the difficulties associated with
a large-scale guestworker program).
307. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301
(2006)).
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alien metaphor, the REAL ID Act labeled people who belong in the United
States as “real,” while describing unauthorized immigrants as unreal or
inauthentic people. Unreal people are not entitled to basic credentials
needed to live and work in society; they do not open bank accounts or rent
apartments. 308 Unreal people live nowhere because they are make-believe.
By rejecting the personhood of immigrants, the alien metaphor facilitates
this outcome.
The amnesty component of immigration reform is an entailment of the
invasion metaphor. “Amnesty” is defined as “the overlooking of the past
Because the invasion metaphor describes
offences of (rebels).” 309
immigration as an especially dangerous threat, however, citizens are
reluctant to overlook the past offenses of aliens through amnesty. If
immigrants are enemy soldiers, as the invasion metaphor suggests, then the
country should capture and defeat them rather than forgive their war crimes.
Although the law of war allows governments to grant amnesty, public
attitudes have become so shaped by the image of battle against aliens that
such acts of forgiveness appear treasonous.
The invasion metaphor entails the need for weapons, fronts, and battle
lines. In the last decade, Congress has allocated billions of dollars to
militarize the border.310 Touting the need for greater “border security,” the
government has installed electronic intrusion sensors and a virtual fence
along sections of the border, while providing agents with night-vision
equipment to see the enemy at all hours.311 Enacting battle plans with
names such as “Operation Hold the Line” and “Operation Blockade,”
immigration officials have coordinated with the U.S. military to deploy
soldiers along the border. 312 Reflecting metaphor’s power to conflate, the
border is now an actual militarized zone with real soldiers and real
casualties.
The flood metaphor also informs contemporary immigration policy.
Immigration reform proposals focus on the need to create a “more
manageable and controlled flow of legal immigrants who can be absorbed

308. See Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien”, 46 WASHBURN
L.J. 268–69 (2007) (discussing recent anti-immigrant legislation).
309. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 941 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
310. See NGAI, supra note 231, at 266 (describing the “stunning militarization” of the
border that occurred in the 1990s); Anne Demo, Sovereignty Discourse and Contemporary
Immigration Politics, 91 Q.J. SPEECH 291, 302 (2005) (explaining how the U.S. military has
constructed elaborate barriers along the border).
311. Demo, supra note 310, at 302 (emphasis added); see also Kate Philips, The War of
Words,
NIEMAN
REP.,
Fall
2006,
at
63,
available
at
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/100346/The-War-of-Words.aspx
(summarizing political efforts to employ the terms “illegal alien” and “border security” to
frame immigration-related issues).
312. See Demo, supra note 310, at 296–97 (summarizing the expansion of defense-related
funding to patrol the border) (emphasis added); see also J. David Cisneros, Contaminated
Communities: The Metaphor of “Immigrant as Pollutant” in Media Representations of
Immigration, 11 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 569, 593 (2008) (discussing the relationship between
border fencing and the image of immigrants as invaders).
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by our economy.” 313 These reforms are set against a backdrop of failure in
immigration enforcement. As discussed above, the flood metaphor
describes the overwhelming force of immigration. An entailment of the
metaphor, therefore, is that attempts to secure the border are futile given the
strength of the immigrant wave.
Through decades of purposeful
underenforcement of immigration laws, millions of unauthorized
immigrants have entered the United States without permission. 314 Much
like local emergency workers who sandbag levies, knowing all the while
that rising floodwaters will overtake their community, politicians discuss
the need to control the alien stream, but enact ineffective enforcement
techniques to achieve that end. 315 Understandably, Americans share a
widespread belief that the government is not doing enough to seal the
border. 316
B. Legal Metaphors and Social Discourse
The conceptual theory of metaphor explains the common immigration
discourses of legal opinions and legislation. Because reasoning is grounded
in our embodied experiences, the social understanding of immigrants
derives from multiple sources.
Human beings absorb metaphors
unconsciously through repeated interactions with their physical worlds and
cultural environments. It is the recurrence of these experiences in a wide
array of social and cultural settings that establishes the basis of human
reasoning. 317 Thus, cognition is not a simple process in which either the
media, or politicians, or Supreme Court Justices construct the image of
immigrants out of whole cloth. Rather, the “truth” about immigration
emerges from a confluence of discourses produced and repeated by many
cultural institutions.
Supreme Court Justices are among the most prominent members of the
American linguistic community. They are “symbolic elites” who wield
extra-legal power by recreating immigration narratives and presenting them
to the social world. 318 Justices express themselves predominately through
313. Press Release, Schumer Announces Principles for Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Bill in Works in Senate (June 24, 2009) (emphasis added), available at
http://schumer.senate.gov /new_website/record.cfm?id=314990.
314. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2007) (describing the nation’s “illegal immigration
system”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 196, at 129–35 (arguing that government officials
largely tolerate unlawful immigration).
315. See Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 857, 867 (2007) (examining the underenforcement of immigration laws).
316. See Jeesun Kim, More than a Political Hot Potato: News Framing of the U.S.
Immigration Debate in Election Years 3, presented at the International Communication
Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, Cal. (May 25, 2007) (showing that eightytwo percent of Americans believe that the government has failed to control illegal entry into
the United States).
317. See Berger, supra note 20, at 176–77 (describing metaphor as a form of “imaginative
rationality”).
318. See Majid Khosravinik, The Representation of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and
Immigrants in British Newspapers During the Balkan Conflict (1999) and the British
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written opinions, 319 and metaphors often provide the most quotable
passages of those opinions. 320 By enhancing the apparent persuasive force
of a particular decision, the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors
increase the likelihood that lower courts will rely upon and cite to them. 321
But the Supreme Court’s discursive influence extends well beyond the
legal community. By authoritatively expressing beliefs shared in law and
society, Supreme Court Justices engage citizens, government officials, and
other non-legal actors through their written opinions. 322 News outlets
publicize Supreme Court decisions within minutes of their release.
Reporters, many of whom have no formal legal training, rarely have time to
read and digest opinions before informing the public of a particular judicial
outcome. 323 Accordingly, members of the media are more likely to quote
vivid metaphoric language that reconfirms existing conceptions about
immigrants. In this way, media reports serve as discrete linguistic acts that
interact with legal texts to provide a prevailing narrative on immigration. 324
Robert Tsai has argued that the Court’s First Amendment metaphors
exude a “disturbing ethos of judicial centrality” that influences the behavior
of non-legal actors. 325 For example, members of the Court have employed
fire metaphors in their free expression rulings to cast themselves as wouldbe firefighters against state attempts to restrict specific speech acts.
According to Tsai, the juricentric posture of the fire metaphor discourages
inter-community dialogue and political engagement by standing as the
definitive account on certain First Amendment matters. 326 The same is true
with metaphoric depictions of immigrants in the law. The Court’s
metaphors absorb and repackage cultural assumptions about immigration,
adding an air of authority, neutrality, and exclusivity to representations that
non-legal actors are invited to accept uncritically.
The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors are models for
understanding the world that masquerade as models of the world. 327 In
order to make this transition believable to readers who interpret texts based
General Election (2005), 20 DISCOURSE & SOC. 477, 479 (2009) (discussing the relationship
between language and ideology).
319. See Maureen Archer & Ronnie Cohen, Sidelines on the (Judicial) Bench: Sports
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 225, 227 (1998) (describing written
opinions as “the most important expression of judicial authority”).
320. See generally BOSMAJIAN, supra note 19, at 13–15 (discussing how courts circulate
and repeat certain metaphors).
321. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 20–21 (1994) (explaining how
metaphors provide legal opinions with substantive force).
322. See Tsai, supra note 18, at 192 (arguing that courts are “intent upon engaging the
American populace”).
323. See Archer & Cohen, supra note 319, at 227–28 (discussing the cultural significance
of Supreme Court opinions).
324. Khosravinik, supra note 318, at 479 (explaining how different public discourses are
formed).
325. Tsai, supra note 18, at 185, 236–39 (criticizing the notion that “the legal system
functions as the hub around which other American institutions orbit”).
326. Id. at 238–39.
327. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 103–04 (1978).
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on their own social experiences, the Court employs metaphors that conform
to existing cultural knowledge about the scope and nature of the perceived
problem. 328 This becomes an entirely circular process in which the Court’s
metaphors join discourses from other cultural institutions to sustain and
reconstitute a “regime of truth” about immigration. 329 In this way,
metaphors become self-fulfilling prophecies by highlighting certain
realities, masking others, and entailing a narrow universe of responses for
readers to consider. 330
Metaphors of criminality, flood, and invasion leave little space for
readers to understand immigration-related issues outside frames selected for
them by the Court and other cultural institutions. 331 Because the mind
develops metaphoric associations unconsciously over a prolonged period of
time, readers are unaware that, absent concerted efforts to critically analyze
Supreme Court texts, images from the past will be recycled as frames for
understanding immigration in the future. 332 As such, without methods for
challenging existing representations, readers will continue to serve as
unknowing accomplices to immigration metaphors and the legal realities
they entail. 333
C. Motivating Analogic Reasoning Through Similes
Metaphor is not an exclusive vehicle for figurative representation. Like
metaphors, similes enable speakers to imagine new concepts in terms of
embodied physical and cultural knowledge. But similes do not conflate
domains in the same manner as metaphors. Instead, similes enable speakers
to recognize and evaluate proposed correspondences with a level of
transparency that metaphors fail to offer.
Similes create explicit associations between target and source domains by
using the words “like” or “as” in their phrasing. 334 Consider the following
simile: “Illegal immigration is like a military invasion.” The statement
invites listeners to notice and assess the contention that illegal entry into the
United States is much like a foreign attack. If readers disagree about the
appropriateness of the comparison, they can articulate their objections and
propose alternative accounts.
328. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2270 (1989) (describing judges as people who
“retail” legal rules by drawing from cultural experiences created at the “wholesale” level).
329. See Hector Amaya, Latino Immigrants in the American Discourses of Citizenship
and Nationalism During the Iraqi War, 4 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 237, 238 (2007) (citing
Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 51, 74 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
1984)).
330. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 156–58 (examining the limitations of
metaphoric entailments).
331. ONO & SLOOP, supra note 236, at 123.
332. See Blavin & Cohen, supra note 95, at 267 (warning against the unconscious
acceptance of metaphors).
333. Boudin, supra note 35, at 413–14 (explaining how metaphors facilitate interactions
between writers and readers).
334. See Shaul E. Cohen & David A. Frank, Jerusalem and the Riparian Simile, 21 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 745, 750 (2002) (examining the descriptive attributes of similes).
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In contrast to similes, metaphors such as “the silent invasion of illegal
aliens” or “border security” morph the figurative into the literal, thereby
concealing the analogic nature of each statement. The metaphor subsumes
differences between the two domains, producing a dangerous literalism that
readers may fail to recognize. 335 Through metaphor, the immigrant
becomes the alien; illegal immigration becomes an invasion.
Given the central role of analogic reasoning in law, the shift from
metaphor to simile involves more than a simple alteration of verbiage.336
Lawyers are professional deductionists and analogists. They are trained to
deduce a legal rule from a statute or holding of a case; 337 they then argue
whether the particular legal norm does or does not govern a given set of
facts based on the similarities or dissimilarities between the norm and the
facts. 338 As discussed above, the personal metaphors of immigration law
rarely facilitate this kind of analysis.339 Rather than attempt to capture a
specific legal concept through analogic reasoning, immigration metaphors
attempt to capture the “essence” of noncitizens by conflating different
domains.
Although lawyers are hard-wired to reason analogically, metaphors shortcircuit the process.
In contrast, similes facilitate new modes for
understanding problems by directly engaging lawyers’ analogic senses. For
example, in the context of immigration discourse, similes allow legal actors
to assess whether immigration is like a flood, or whether unauthorized
immigrants are like violent criminals.340 If readers determine that aspects
of the source and target domains are divergent or contradictory, they will
reject the simile in favor of other frames that comport with their physical
and cultural understandings of the world. Thus, similes not only allow for
the rational evaluation of current figurative expressions, they make room
for new immigration frames as readers reject other models. As such,
similes ask members of the linguistic community to recognize and contest
certain representations of immigrants that, if stated in metaphoric terms,
would pass silently into the legal imagination without discussion.
D. Migration and Economic Sanctuary as Outlaw Metaphors
Even if similes attain a more prominent place in legal discourse,
metaphors will remain a fundamental component of language and
335. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1386–87 (explaining how
metaphoric statements can transform into myths).
336. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748 (1993)
(discussing the centrality of analogy in law).
337. Hunter, supra note 57, at 1238–42 (discussing assumptions about the processes of
legal deduction and analogy).
338. See Boudin, supra note 35, at 406 n.73 (arguing that lawyers use analogy “to invoke
the accepted norm that, if two different situations are sufficiently alike, they should be
treated alike by the law”).
339. See supra Part I.C and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of conflation
posed by immigration metaphors).
340. Cohen & Frank, supra note 334, at 761 (arguing that similes can restructure conflict
frames that appear entrenched).

1592

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

thought. 341 The human mind cannot always rationally assess multiple and
overlapping correspondences. In order to simplify decisions, we depend on
the cognitive shortcuts provided by metaphors. 342 Therefore, in order to
challenge the popular metaphoric representations of immigrants in the law,
critics cannot simply ignore existing representations, but rather must offer a
new set of words, images, and modes of figurative thought to compete with
current frames.
The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors are not immutable.
Because metaphors are socially contingent, the Court’s metaphoric choices
will change as social understandings of immigrants change. At first glance,
then, the goal of altering existing representations appears exceedingly
difficult; after all, major cultural shifts take time. But the introduction of
competing metaphors does not require such a radical change. Linguistic
metaphors are not merely products of embodied knowledge but also
methods for re-creating culture. Like political discourse, the law is situated
and contingent. 343 When legal actors present new methods for talking
about a problem, they create opportunities for altering social discourse and
the social understanding of the problem as well.
Because today’s immigration metaphors represent only a partial selection
of reality, competing representations should draw from aspects of existing
cultural knowledge that current metaphors fail to utilize. For example, the
Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors rely on embodied understandings
of crime and invasion, but ignore issues related to movement and economic
survival—concepts deeply embedded in our historical and cultural
knowledge. Thus, the task of introducing new legal metaphors is not so
much about modifying culture as it is accessing cultural references that
members of the linguistic community already possess.
Before competing representations can emerge, however, legal actors must
unwrap and evaluate current frames. Because metaphors loosen their hold
on the human imagination only through negotiation and debate, much of the
foregoing analysis has been directed toward that end.344 The limitation of
this approach, however, is that it largely retells someone else’s story. 345
The critical discussion must extend beyond the problems associated with
existing metaphors so that legal actors might imagine new metaphoric
possibilities.
341. See Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he Will Come: Judicial Opinions,
Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L. REV. 813, 817–18 (1996) (describing
metaphors as unavoidable aspects of discourse).
342. See Charteris-Black, supra note 271, at 565–72 (examining the role metaphor plays
as a cognitive heuristic); Duncan, supra note 90, at 799–800 (explaining how human
communication depends on metaphors).
343. See David T. Ritchie, The Centrality of Metaphor in Legal Analysis and
Communication: An Introduction, 58 MERCER L. REV. 839, 841–42 (2007) (arguing that
discourses can change as speakers employ new metaphors).
344. See Otto Santa Ana, ‘Like an Animal I Was Treated’: Anti-Immigrant Metaphor in
U.S. Public Discourse, 10 DISCOURSE & SOC. 191, 203 (1999) (examining entrenched
metaphors).
345. See Boudin, supra note 35, at 420–21 (discussing the limitations of rebuttal as a
mechanism for challenging metaphoric associations).
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According to cognitive linguists, the human mind is more likely to adopt
metaphors stated in positive terms. 346 Metaphors “work” when they offer
affirmative correspondences between source and target domains. Thus, it is
insufficient to explain why immigrants are not criminals or why
immigration is not like an overwhelming flood. Likewise, terms such as
“undocumented worker” and “noncitizen” present rather uncompelling
accounts because they describe immigrants in the negative.347 In contrast,
new metaphors must explain affirmatively what immigration is and who
immigrants are based on a shared body of cultural knowledge. 348
Here I examine the ideas of migration and economic sanctuary 349 as
“outlaw” metaphors. 350 By “outlaw,” I mean a category of concepts that tie
into existing embodied knowledge but have not gained currency in popular
discourse. Outlaw discourses appear strange because they do not comport
with dominant accounts created by conventional metaphors. As they are
circulated and tested against experiential knowledge, however, these
metaphors may eventually shift from outlaw to dominant components of a
new immigration vernacular. 351
The concept of migration focuses on the personhood of unauthorized
immigrants. Under the taxonomy proposed here, noncitizens residing
lawfully in the United States are referred to as “immigrants,” while those
without authorization are called “migrants.” A migrant is “a person who
moves temporarily . . . from place to place.”352 Unlike illegal aliens who
commit crimes in the shadows, migrants are people who move, work, and
live openly in and between societies.
Migration involves a temporary movement between places that results in
permanent residence in sending and receiving countries. Migrants travel
between places, but their travel will not last forever; they will someday
settle within a nation-state. An entailment of migration, therefore, is that
346. Collective Latino Power—Myth or Reality, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 75, 107–08
(2004).
347. LAKOFF & FERGUSON, supra note 32, at 4 (listing problems with the “undocumented”
frame).
348. See Smith, supra note 63, at 186–91 (examining methods for establishing new
metaphors).
349. Although many scholars have examined the legal, moral, and policy-based
implications of these and similar terms, this Article examines the concepts of migration and
economic sanctuary purely from a metaphoric standpoint. See generally Howard F. Chang,
The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global Distributive
Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2008); Gregory A. Loken &
Lisa R. Babino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration
Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1993); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Building Capacity for
the Transnational Regulation of Migration, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 2–7 (2010)
(explaining the need to manage migration through bilateral mechanisms); Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567,
600–05 (2008) (discussing the evolution of sanctuary laws in the United States); Rose
Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 133, 137–38 (2008)
(differentiating between public and private sanctuaries in the immigration debate).
350. ONO & SLOOP, supra note 236, at 22 (defining “outlaw discourses”).
351. Id. at 139–40.
352. 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 758 (2d ed. 1989); see also THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 2010), http://dictionary.oed.com.
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both sending and receiving countries must adopt frameworks for
encouraging belonging among all residents—an outcome that is especially
needed in a transnational era. 353
Upon arrival in the United States, migrants inevitably formulate ties to
employers, social networks, and cultural institutions. Migrants who travel
to a specific nation with only a temporary intent to stay often become legal
permanent residents as their community connections expand.354 But even
migrants who never obtain legal status should be treated as presumptive
members of receiving countries. Nations maintain a vested interest in
fostering social belonging among all residents. Both citizens and
noncitizens benefit from modes of social discourse that offer migrants a
long-term stake in the welfare of their communities. 355 As such, the
migration metaphor recognizes the inevitability of migrants in a
transnational age and the need to encourage cooperation between
community members, regardless of the outcome of any one person’s
migrant journey.
The idea of economic sanctuary brings focus to the reasons people
migrate between nations. 356 By “economic sanctuary,” I employ a
decidedly non-legal definition, as immigration law does not provide relief
for economic persecution alone. 357 In addition, unlike the migrant
metaphor (a linguistic term that could conceivably displace “illegal alien” in
the legal vernacular), I examine the economic sanctuary metaphor for its
conceptual benefits only. In other words, migration is a method for talking
about immigration, whereas economic sanctuary is a method for thinking
about immigration.
To grant “sanctuary” means “to place in safety” or “to afford protection
or shelter.” 358 As such, economic sanctuary describes migrants as people
seeking shelter in the United States in order to endure economically. Most
immigrants come to the United States in order to escape poverty and find
353. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 196, at 168–88 (arguing that legal
immigration should serve as a process of transition to citizenship); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Between National and Post-National: Membership in the United States, 4 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 241, 241–42 (1999) (explaining how migrants can maintain transnational identities while
residing within traditional nation-states); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship,
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 579–80 (2007) (discussing modes for fostering greater political and
economic participation among immigrants); Rodríguez, supra note 234, at 1116 (explaining
why nations should establish mechanisms for encouraging belonging among noncitizens).
354. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers,
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1410–11 (2009) (explaining why extending rights of inclusion to
unauthorized immigrants enhances the workplace rights of all employees).
355. Rodríguez, supra note 305, at 267 (discussing the inevitability of future immigrant
generations and the need to encourage immigrant integration).
356. See LAKOFF & FERGUSON, supra note 32, at 4–5 (describing immigrants as
“economic refugees”); Philips, supra note 311, at 63 (discussing the political implications of
the term “economic refugee”).
357. See Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994); see also John S. W. Park,
Who Belongs in America? Presidents, Rhetoric, and Immigration, 10 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF.
747, 751 (2007) (book review) (discussing the inability of economic refugees to obtain
immigration relief).
358. 14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 443 (2d ed. 1989).
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work. 359 Yet current immigration metaphors conceal migrants’ economic
entrepreneurship, instead presenting immigrants as criminals and invaders.
In contrast, the economic sanctuary metaphor brings focus to the forced
displacement of people, thereby inviting readers to evaluate the complex
causes of illegal immigration. 360 For example, recent trade and structural
adjustment policies have hampered employment opportunities in many
developing countries. 361 When small businesses cannot compete with
transnational corporations in the production of goods and services, local
farms and factories must close and lay off workers. Migrants are born from
these circumstances. 362 Seen in this light, migrants are neither criminals
nor invaders, but instead people who cross international borders in order to
survive. As such, the economic sanctuary metaphor brings focus to the
human consequence of globalization.
Metaphors are effective only to the extent that they rely on shared
cultural frames. 363 Thus, listeners will accept migration and economic
sanctuary as metaphors only if the concepts comport with their physical,
social, and cultural experiences. American historical narratives shed an
exceedingly positive light on the concept of migration. Since colonial
times, Americans have sought to improve their economic status through
relocation. 364 Tied to notions of “frontier” and “exploration,” migration
draws on popular historical accounts of national progress.365 Likewise,
neoclassical economic theory posits that societies flourish when markets
allow human capital to flow freely. 366 As such, members of society gain
359. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 741–
42 (2003) (arguing that the factors causing dislocation among international migrants have
increased in recent years); see also Capps, supra note 88 at 187–88 (examining high labor
participation rates among unauthorized immigrants).
360. See BACON, supra note 234, at 68 (arguing that immigration reform proposals rarely
account for the effect of trade policy on migrants).
361. See Christopher W. Rudolph, Globalization, Sovereignty, and Migration: A
Conceptual Framework, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 325, 330–31 (1998); Katherine
E. Seitz, Comment, Enter at Your Own Risk: The Impact of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v.
National Labor Relations Board on the Undocumented Worker, 82 N.C. L. REV. 366, 368
n.12 (2003) (discussing the relationship between trade agreements and international
migration); see also STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION:
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 104 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing causes of increased international migration).
362. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Book Review, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 356,
357–59 (2010) (reviewing DAVID BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES
MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS (2008)) (examining the interrelation of trade and
immigration policies).
363. See Margaret Webb Smith, The Minutemen Versus the ‘United Army of Illegal
Aliens’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of WWW Representations 169 (2007) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with author) (arguing that altering
dominant metaphors is a “monumental task”).
364. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining the historical
association of migration with financial reward).
365. See Wu, supra note 236, at 42 (discussing internal migration in the United States).
366. Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of Emigration and
Migration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 236 (2006).
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economically when all workers can travel between jobs. Seen through these
frames, migration is an economically effective process that governments
should encourage.
In addition to the foregoing social, economic, and historical accounts, the
migration metaphor relates to readers’ personal life experiences as well.
People often associate economic growth with physical movement. We
move to attend schools. We travel to new cities in search of employment.
We understand that personal advances in education, wealth, and security
often require physical movement. Drawing on these associations, the
concept of migration depicts immigrants as economically motivated people
whose movement enhances social welfare.
The economic sanctuary metaphor also references shared experiences.
Popular accounts of globalization present displaced American workers as
victims of outsourcing. Society remains largely sympathetic to Americans
who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own. Accordingly, state
and federal legislatures extend unemployment benefits and job training to
these workers. Building on this embodied knowledge, the economic
sanctuary metaphor emphasizes the connections shared by migrants and
displaced American workers; just as Americans become unemployed when
their jobs are shipped overseas, migrants feel the consequences of
international trade from the other side of the border. In this way, the
economic sanctuary metaphor taps into cultural beliefs about the need to
assist innocent, hard-working people who are harmed by international
forces beyond their control.
The terms proposed here offer admittedly imperfect representations.
Because the process of mapping qualities from source to target domains is
always partial, no single metaphor can fully capture any one concept.367
For example, not every instance of migration is motivated by poverty or a
lack of opportunity, as the economic sanctuary metaphor suggests; some
people migrate in order to flee political persecution, while others move to
live with family members. Even for those people who migrate out of
economic necessity, nations may still choose to deny them sanctuary. In
this way, the economic sanctuary metaphor is not a prescription for
immigration policy but rather a conceptual vehicle for thinking about
immigration in a global context. The metaphor does not foreclose realistic
immigration restrictions but encourages policymakers to develop those
restrictions based on representations that reflect the diverse and nuanced
causes of international migration.368

367. See Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors
for New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403, 425 (2003) (noting that even
“‘correct’ metaphor[s] constrain thought”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter:
How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
225, 273–77 (1995) (explaining the process of formulating alternatives to existing
metaphors).
368. See O’Brien, supra note 183, at 45 (examining how immigration policies emerge
from social myths).
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Because metaphors involve individualized, unconscious associations,
these proposals may cause readers to ascribe characteristics to target groups
that are neither intended nor desired. For example, although the concept of
migration highlights immigrants’ entrepreneurship and economic
contributions, it may also encourage an image of migrants as rootless
wanderers. These associations cannot be avoided. As stated above,
migration involves a temporary movement that results in permanent
residence. Therefore, the metaphor encourages thought about how to treat
members of this “wandering” class, given that a person’s transient presence
often morphs into permanent residence. But even if readers overlook the
temporary nature of migration and view migrants as a perpetual class, the
term still stimulates debate about the global factors causing international
migration and the need to enhance the affiliations that members of this
perceived transient class have with existing social, civic, and cultural
institutions.
Abstract concepts such as immigration entail different, sometimes
contradictory, realities. Therefore, multiple metaphoric expressions are
needed in order to establish meaning. 369 The goal of this project, then, is
not to offer terms that comprehensively describe immigration, but rather to
expand the cluster of metaphors used to talk and think about
immigration. 370
The potential awkwardness of the migration and economic sanctuary
metaphors speaks to the ubiquity of existing representations. Outlaw
discourses may seem strange or unrealistic to readers.371 But the economic
sanctuary metaphor appears peculiar only because other metaphors such as
invasion and flood appear normal. Likewise, the migration metaphor feels
artificial only when terms such as illegal alien and undocumented worker
appear to delineate the bounds of our discursive realities. Thus, in addition
to highlighting new aspects of immigration-related issues, the terms
proposed here serve as effective tools for deconstructing popular
representations. This critical process diminishes the power of existing
metaphors to conflate and essentialize, while creating space for new frames
in the legal imagination.
CONCLUSION
Human beings tell stories in order to comprehend the world around them.
As the nation’s preeminent legal storyteller, the Supreme Court has
employed a host of metaphors to tell its immigration stories. Complete with
heroes, villains, and foreboding plotlines, these stories describe aliens
attacking, invaders encroaching, and floods overwhelming communities.
Behaving like good audience members, most judges, lawyers, and scholars
have passively accepted this narrative.
369. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1492 (arguing that multiple
metaphors create meaning).
370. See Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 61, at 200–06 (discussing the limitations of
individual metaphoric representations).
371. Cisneros, supra note 312, at 592 (discussing the ubiquity of standard narratives).
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If they were not obscured by metaphors, the images of immigrants in
Supreme Court texts would appear comical, if not utterly tragic. For
example, immigrants are not animals that succumb to “lure[s]” or are
hunted by “roving patrols.” 372 Capturing migrants is not equivalent to
cleaning up a “leaking hazardous waste dump,” even if the Supreme Court
describes immigration in those terms. 373 Yet metaphor’s power to distort
and pass without notice enables these and other dehumanizing
representations to evade evaluation.
Because conceptual metaphors live in the imagination, attempts at
revision must draw on the imaginative possibilities of language. If we can
imagine immigration as an invasion, then we can also imagine it as a
method for improving economic stability and national welfare. If, through
metaphor, immigrants can be viewed as aliens and illegals, then they can
also be viewed as migrants, workers, and community members. By
critically evaluating metaphor—the cornerstone of immigration stories—we
can approach legal opinions with a sense of agency, thereby rejecting the
inevitability of current frames. From there, we might imagine a new
immigration discourse for future legal texts—one that emphasizes
cooperation over struggle, contribution over battle, and personhood over
alienage.

372. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 471 n.15 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
373. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984) (emphasis added).

